24 OCT 1972

## Egyption Army

## unrest tests

## Sadat diplomacy

By John K. Cooley

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Beirut, Lebanon

Last week's reported Egyptian Army unrest in Cairo was a relatively minor incident with possibly major future implications for President Anwar al-Sadat's government, informed observers here believe.

President Sadat might clarify the situation in a major speech, which Cairo Radio said was scheduled Oct. 25, these observers thought. Meanwhile Egyptian Government sources and travelers from Cairo did not confirm initial reports Oct. 21 and 22 from the British Broadcasting Corporation of a major coup attempt by several hundred Army officers said to have driven into Cairo at the head of two or more columns of armored personnel carriers a week earlier.

They did, however, indicate that at least one junior Army officer, described as a captain, led several armored cars to Cairo's Al Hussein Mosque. The captain delivered a fiery oration demanding immediate war against Israel to end the stalemate along the Suez Canal, where he said Egyptian soldiers were "eating the bitter sands of Suez."

He and a few followers are said to have been arrested immediately.

The incident, its ramifications, and the number and rank of officers implicated are all in doubt at this writing. What is certain is that it reflected the profound state of dissatisfaction in the Egyptian armed forces.

Neither President Sadat's diplomatic efforts to end the state of "no war, no peace" with Israel, his removal of Soviet military advisers last summer, nor his current efforts (begun by Egyptian Prime Minister Aziz Sidky's visit to Moscow last week) to improve ties with the Soviets have changed this. Neither the United States nor Western Europe have responded to President Sadat's hopes for moral, diplomatic, and economic support — hopes which President Sadat again expressed publicly in an interview appealing for West European understanding of Egypt's position, broadcast by the French state television network Oct. 21.

#### Mutiny reported

The incident at the Al Hussein Mosque about Oct. 16 and ensuing special security measures in Cairo came about three weeks after the reported mutiny of an Egyptian

Its men were said to be clamoring for immediate action against Israel in retaliation for Israeli attacks on Lebanon in September.

Miles Copeland, former U.S. diplomat and Central Intelligence Agency official in the Middle East, said in an interview here that senior Egyptian officers "have been suspecting this sort of thing was coming for some time."

President Sadat's security men, Mr. Copeland speculated, may have deliberately led on or provoked the "coup" attempt in order to pinpoint dissident junior officers "whose names nobody ever heard of."

#### Discipline lag seen


Mr. Copeland, once a friend of the late President Nasser and author of the best-selling book, "The Game of Nations," about U.S. relations with Mr. Nasser, said that under President Nasser "discipline in the Egyptian Army was very, very good. It has broken down recently, not so much because of people genuinely wanting to fight Israel, but because they have lost their pride. President Sadat knows this very, very well. He's taken all sorts of measures to try to reinstate some pride in his Army."

Mr. Copeland recalled that President Nasser in late years "got very, very suspicious of those around him, particularly senior Army commanders." President Nasser, according to Mr. Copeland, began to develop young officers as a counterweight to the more senior ones.

In Mr. Copeland's view, these younger officers were like "time bombs" planted within the Egyptian system, which President Sadat now wants to flush out and defuse.

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29 SEP 1972



bombing of Pearl Harbor? Or would

they quietly agree with the Egyptian

chief of staff who, just after Sadat made

a few too-specific threats against Israel,

said, "This time the idiot has gone too far!" and remove themselves from the

One could go on and on. The leader

Bassiouni

streets?

Follett, 429 pp., \$8.95

## A Child's Guide to the Arabs

MILES COPELAND

The first play to be based on the life of President Nasser appeared last week in Beirut, Lebanon, in a gymnasium-cum-auditorium called "The Theatre of Revolution." It will never reach Broadway; the audience was unenthusiastic-or perhaps just bewildered; there were no cries for "author" (anyway, the author was anonymous); it ran for only three nights and got only one review ("Elegant in its simplicity," said an arty, left-wing French-language weekly). But there was one line which I treasure: "If my people believe all I say," mused the play's Nasser, "they are missing the point."

The author must have known Nasser personally, for Nasser spoke often in these terms of the contradictions in "Arab" public opinion, and of the difficulties they posed for any leader addressing his public. To attain power, the leader of an

Arab country must make bigger and better promises than his rivals. Since no one expects him to carry them out (Israel, the CIA or some other outside force can be counted upon to intervene), the sky is the limit. Once in power, he may invent the outside force if it doesn't appear, or he can make substitute promises, or merely forget the old ones. Despite what they are fond of saying of themselves, "Arabs" have amazingly short memories.

Bur that's not all. The leader of an Arab country must make his promises in terms which the members of his audience think they accept, but really don't. He must have the knack of speaking passionately and earnestly in one set of terms, while allowing his audience to understand that they may add up what he says in quite another.


Take Arab nationalism, for example. No leader of an Arab country could attain power, or hold it for long, were he not to manifest fervent support to the notion of Arab unity. But how long would, say, President Sadat of Egypt last were his people really to believe that he intends to unite Egypt with other Arab countries? (His colonels may figure some way of annexing Libya before "U-Day" in September 1973, but only a Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-F age of his people believe he intends to

Israel. President Sadat must periodically assure his people that Egypt will "never" make peace, and that his armies are poised on the border ready to go. But suppose those youngsters shouting hawkish slogans in Cairo's Liberation Square were to wake up one morning to learn that their President had actually ordered the Egyptian army to cross the Suez Canal, what then? Would they proceed to the nearest recruiting offices, making lines two blocks long like those we saw in American cities after the

"unite" Egypt with it.) Or war with

of an Arab country attains and holds power by denouncing the United States and praising Russia, yet he spends a fair percentage of his waking hours try-. ing to figure ways of making secret deals with the United States, or with private American interests, showing clearly that he values his deals with the Soviets mainly for what they are worth as leverage in negotiating alternative sources of aid. He pours praise on the Palestinians, addressing them as "our Arab brethren," yet he treats them as foreigners, and second-rate foreigners at that. (The Libyan government allowed some four thousand Palestinians to become Libyan citizens, but has since rescinded the decision, and is currently working out a deportation scheme which will be much less conspicuous than that of Uganda's against its Asian population, but just as thorough.) Most important, the leaders of Arab countries must constantly talk "revolution," yet their various "Revolutionary Command Councils" talk and think in terms which would have been considered reactionary in the days of the Ottoman Empire.

So now does a young diplomat or international businessman prepare himself for an assignment in the so-called "Arab world"? What does he read? Visit the State Department library, or RDP80+01604R000800240001ti0nal corporations, and you will find more



## Nasser, Arab Firebrand or Humanitarian?

By EDMUND FULLER

In July, 1952, a group of Egyptian army officers carried out a coup that deposed King Farouk and proclaimed a military government under the titular leadership of General Mohammed Neguib. In fact the principal leader of the revolution was Lt. Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser. On the eve of the coup, he found one of his associates in an overly emotional state and said to him, in English, "Tonight there is no room for sentiment, we must be ready for the unexpected." Asked why he had spoken in English, "Nasser replied with a laugh that Arabic was not a suitable language to express the need for calm."

Even so slight an anecdote reveals more than most Americans have known about the

man who ushered Egypt into the modern world and altered the balances of power in the Middle East. The American public has seen him generally as a strident na-

Tl:e Bookshelf

tionalist, a Pan-Arabist and a military adventurist. Countering this, the anecdate effers a glimpse of the range of his education, his cool deliberateness and his humor. It exemplifies the numerous surprises in Anthony Nutting's biography, "Nasser" (Dutton, 493 pages, \$10), a book crammed with important historical-political information and at the same time full of human interest.

It would be hard to find another man so well qualified to write such a book. Anthony Nutting is a scholar and diplomat with particular expertise in the tangled Middle East. He served England as Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 1951, negotiated with Nasser the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1954, and was later Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and leader of the U.K. delegation to the General Assembly of the U.N.

It is fair to ask if an Englishman of such background could write with detachment about events in which he participated, in an arena in which his country had been an imperial power. Putting aside the fact that nobody can write really objectively about anything. Mr. Nutting does bring remarkable detachment to materials involving some of the most inflammatory political passions of the contury. He resigned from his government post in 1956 in protest against the English-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in the Suez crisis.

Mr. Nutting begins his book with a needed brief review of Egyptian history, noting that Nasser became "the first true Egyptian to rule Egypt since the Persian conquest nearly 2,500 years before." The dynasty which ended with Farouk was Turkish. After "two and a half thousand years of taking orders successively from Persian, Greek. Roman, Byzantine, Arab, Kurdish, Turkish, French and British proconsuls, the people of Egypt were at long last to regain their national statehood." Without awareness of these centuries

of subservience and impoverishment the nationalistic emotional force behind Nasser's reign cannot be understood.

Nasser, born in 1918 in Alexandria, was the son of a post-office worker who came from a proud clan of Upper (Southern) Egypt. He educated himself zealously and was a prodigious reader in his teens, including such writers as Voltaire, Rousseau and Dickens. He studied the lives of Alexander, Julius Caesar, Napoleon and Gandhi. He became a fervent nationalist. As the son of a fellah he was barred from the Military Academy, his best hope of more advanced education, but by persistence he gained admittance.

Early he became convinced that the military structure, rather than subterranean political parties, would be the path to power and revolution. At no time, even when playing the Soviets against the West, was Nasser ever a Communist or interested in leftist ideology. The rise of Nasser is the history of modern Egypt. Mr. Nutting traces this closely in a book that is fascinating but densely textured and demanding. American readers will have special interest in the treatment of the Aswan Dam affair, the Suez Crisis, and the Six Days War of 1967.

Mr. Nutting is harsh in his judgment of his own Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, whom he believes to have badly mismanaged Middle Eastern policies. He is equally severe about John Foster Dulles on many detailed counts. By his "renege" on the Aswan High Dam, Mr. Nutting charges, "Dulles had . . . pulled down the pillars of the temple on Western influence not only in Egypt, but throughout the Arab world as well." He shows Nasser as driven reluctantly toward the Soviets when he preferred Western alliances. He had no illusions about the Russians.

Mr. Nutting takes no notice of the ironic aspects of the Aswan High Dam, which has not been able to bring the hoped for agricultural and economic advancements, and about which increasing suspicions arise that it may be ecologically disastrous to the whole Eastern Mediterranean. As lightweight but provocative collateral reading I recommend the current "Aswan," by Michael Heim (Knopf, 275 pages, \$6.95) which is chilling science-fiction in a simulated documentary style.

One can barely suggest the scope and detail of this historical-political biography. Nasser is presented in the round. Among many surprising things is the close contact long maintained with him by the CIA, chiefly through the person of Kermit Roosevelt who won Nasser's confidence on terms of true personal friendship. We see skilled American diplomats in Cairo whose advice was ignored by various administrations back home.

The Egyptian leader had charm and also grace under pressure. His humor was often rucful. Sucked by misjudgment and misinformation into a long military entanglement in Yemen, which sometimes involved half his armed forces, Nasser called it "My Vict-

nam." Often at odds with Jordan's King Hussein, Nasser said to him after the catastrophe of the Six Days War, as the king was departing for America: "I got you into this mess, so forget about my losses and go and kiss Lyndon Johnson's hand and ask him to give you back the West Bank."

He had handled himself brilliantly in the Sucz Crisis, had erred badly in the Six Days War and the Yemen affair. In his last action, as chairman of the conference of Arab countries seeking to end the warfare between Husscin and the Palestine liberation forces in Jordan in 1970, he was again at his best, prompting Mr. Nutting to cite "an old saying in the Moslem scriptures that those who are about to die often speak and act with exceptional wisdom and vision." A few days later he was dead—worn out.

Nasser had faults and made errors but he also had greatness and did much for Egypt. After Suez, "It would have required a man of almost superhuman qualities not to be carried away by the idolatry with which Nasser was now hailed by the Arab masses." He was carried away into his Pan-Arab adventurism, dreaming of uniting the Arab world into one political entity and falling utterly because "he consistently failed to understand his fellow Arabs." He emerged from that worst period not in irresponsible rage, but wiser.

Mr. Nutting offers one exceptionally-informed man's view of a span of history involving major events and great passions. No one will agree with all of it—a few, perhaps, will agree with none of it—but it is one of the more important current books for thoughtful Americans to read and ponder.

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
#### Ex-Cairo Publisher Freed From Prison

BEIRUT, July 18 (AP)— Mustafa Amin, once one of Egypt's leading publishers, was released from prison in Cairo last night and trans-ferred to a hospital, the Beirut newspaper An Nahar reported today.

The report said President Anwar Sadat ordered Amin's release because of his health. He is 59 and was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1965 on charges of spying for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

### STA**TANP**toved For Releas 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000800240001-0

20 MAY 1972



# Egypt publicizes spy underground'arrests

By OSWALD JOHNSTON Sun Staff Correspondent

its most spectacular and most selves, but that they have been publicized spy story in many made public all at once. months.

across the front pages of Cai-dence, unable to make war or Ahram yesterday, that a lawyer and a university-trained economist who headed a band of dissident intellectuals had criticism at home that already access to President Anwar Sad-resulted in students rioting in at's offices and preached his downtown Cairo last month. overthrow.

#### Kept in dark

Earlier in the week, Cairo's citizens, usually kept in the had been told:

1. About two dozen intellectuals had formed an underground ring called "Arab Vanhad been arrested.

other lawyer described as the universities through indoctrina- front headquarters of the Arab The government rigorously ringleader, were arrested in tion and officer training cadres. Socialist Union, Egypt's only blocked any attempt to spread Helwan, the industrial suburb and he linked the disorders to political party. It, too, did not the story and threatened to rewhere labor unrest serously dis-Israeli intelligence, citing the go off. turbed the Sadat regime last leaflets found on the three for-September, and were accused eigners. of setting up an underground | There was also a matter of was "fishy," a planted agaent | When the leak finally occell hostile to the regime.

4. Three foreigners, a Belgian surveillance for many months. father and son and a French The front apparently existed student, had been caught ear-exclusively as a propaganda delier this month distributing vice, operating outside Egypt anti-regime and anti-Soviet leaf- as well as within. Anti-regime lets and admitted having been leaflets attributed to the front recruited by Israeli intelligence, were found in Egypt as early

To most, the answer seems The latest installment in a clear. The Sadat regime has a coherent policy.

> Thus, faced with mounting! Mr. Sadat has moved to declare capitals and in Beirut. publicly that too much criticism is tantamount to disloyalty, if not treason.

To many long-time observers dark about all such sensitive legacy of the police state asof Egypt, this is an obvious curity forces. pects of the Nasser era.

#### Indoctrination, training

guard Organization" and dedidissent, the gambit could not and security personnel live. The about three months later, some cated to the overthrow of "re- have been more obvious, the shop catered to Soviet business, details of the incident had cirgimes in all Arab countries." students who were jailed were The bomb did not go off.
The lawyer and economist were released, and Mr. Sadat spoke About the same time, a described as ringleaders and all mollifyingly. But he also moved ter bomb with a crudely fash- By December, the story to establish a greater political ioned lusing device triggered reached some members of the 2. Five people, including an and military presence in the by acid was planted at the Nile permanent foreign press corps.

timing. The source of the leaf- provocateur group. 3. An American "woman dip- lets that on this occasion were tians admit had been under time, the front also made an

What interests practiced ob- as last July, when an attempted appearance on Dutch elevision. Sun Staff Correspondent servers of the Egyptian scene Communist coup in the Sudan Some Western observers by Cairo—Egypt is going through is not so much the facts them-provoked anti-Russian sentitions and most servers but they have been provoked anti-Russian sentitions. ment in the Arab world.

As early as last August, mimeographed leaflets in English check and reached the same drama that has been played been suffering a crisis of confi-were distributed to newspaper conclusion. offices in the United States. most a week now is the news, blazoned in the newspaper Al with either, and unable to forge the Russians or Americans help Egyptian National Front will with either and unable to forge to the Egyptian National Front will the control of the student dissent made it, in the view of many, a useful weapon to refight Soviet imperialism till the store homefront docility. very end with every means and method available." leaflets, in English and Arabic, have been seen in European

was implicated in two Cairo was arrested in Alexandria bomb scares that for a time sometime during the fall. She seriously bothered Egyptian se-had been chatting with Russian

planted in a shop in Zamalek, syping. the section where many Soviet Bv the time she was released In the case of the student diplomats, military advisers and expelled from the country

About the same time, a canis cles.

ready suspicion that the front any leaks.

lomat"-later identified as a used to discredit student dissent surfaced in Paris, and a self- Heikal, President Sadat's confisecretary—had been arrested in was a so-called "Egyptian Na-styled leader of the group held dant and adviser and editor of an espionage case late last tional Front," which the Egyp- a news conference. About this Al Ahram.

might be involved, and the Egyptians have since claimed they sent agents to Europe to

But none of this surfaced pub-

Similar timing is involved in Similar the case of the American secretary. The woman, a blond typist in the American interest section in Cairo who has been By late September, the front identified as Sue Anne Harris, personnel near the Soviet-held One of the bomb stories in- West Harbor, according to one volved a package of explosives account, and was accused of

culated in Cairo diplomatic cir-

taliate against at least one By this time, there was all news organization if there were

curred, it came from none oth-In early December, the group er than Mohamed Hassnein

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2 2 FEB 1972



Egypt smashes U.S.-Israeli plot

CAIRO — The semi-official Egyptian daily newspaper, al-Ahram ("The Pyramids"), said on Monday that Egyptian security police had discovered three underground anti-government groups tied in with U.S. and Israeli intelligence, and that charges were being prepared against them. Al-Ahram said the leader of one of the groups, the so-called "Arab Vanguard Organization" (al-Tali'a al-'Arabiyya), was Abdel Shafei. Eissa, who was employed on the staff of President Anwar el-Sadat as an economist.

Earlier, al-Ahram revealed that an American and several Belgian and French citizens were involved in espionage and plotting against the government. The American was identified as Sue Anne Harris, who worked in Cairo as a "secretary" in the U.S. Mission (U.S.-Egyptian diplomatic ties were severed in 1967, but the U.S. maintains a Mission in the Spanish Embassy in Cairo). Al-Ahram editor, Mohammed Hassanein Heykal, wrote that Miss Harris was caught "red-handed" in the act of trying to obtain secret information on Egyptian air strength; she was released last December, he said. She was a liaison agent for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Heykal wrote.

20 FEB 1972

## Freed 'Spy' Named in Cairo

CAIRO (UPI)—An American woman arrested last year by Egyptian a uthorities for spying was identified yester-day by political sources as Sue Anne Harris. She was released and put on a U.S.-bound airplane in December, the sources said.

The sources said she had worked here as a secretary for the American mission, which is attached to the Spanish Hara bassy here. The United States and Egypt do not maintain full diplomatic relations.

In Washington, the State Department refused to comment even to the extent of revealing Miss Harris' hometown.

. News of the arrest last September and the subsequent release was first made public by Mohammed Heikal, editor of day column.

Heikal said the incident sparked a diplomatic crisis which Washington said could obstruct Middle East peace ef-

Without naming the woman, Heikal said she had been caught "red-handed" in the act of spying.

Political sources said the woman met Russians at the parties given by a wealthy Egyptian of Greek descent at his villa outside of Alexandria. She showed only a general interest in Soviet activities at first, but later asked the Soviet advisers specific questions.

Heikal said the woman was caught "trying to find out information about the new Sovi-

the semi-official Al Ahram et planes in Egypt." She was newspaper, in his regular Fripart of a "gigantic espionage part of a "gigantic espionage case" and served as a liaison for an Egyptian agent of the Central Intelligence Agency, Heikal said.

Washington asked for the woman's release, the editor said, but was told an investi-gation must be completed first. The woman was released after three months and put aboard a flight for the United States.

## Party Votes Support for Sadat's Policy

William Dullforce Special to The Washington Post

ership that he had been seek- going to Israel after his visit

-An extraordinary congress of the Arab Socialist Union, in Cairo remained silent on the country's only legal party, charges made yesterday by passed a resolution at the clos- Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, ing session of a three-day chief editor of the authoritameeting expressing faith in tive the Egyptian president's leadership and vowing to stand woman diplomat had been desolidly behind him.

At the opening session on Wednesday, Sadat had offered Egypt. to resign at any time if the country lost confidence in his policies.

Sadat's "postponement" of the leased. confrontation with Israel and of hostilities had to wait until Egypt was fully prepared.

#### Commando Action

Sadat told a closed session of the congress yesterday that if should be possible with better coordination to step up commando action against Israel, but he said that the decision to go to war would be taken only when preparations were complete.

Answering a demand for action against American oil interests in the Middle East, the president said that oil was a double-edged weapon and that; the Arabs had other, more effective ways, of bringing pressure on the United States.

On the home front, Sadat took a firm stand toward students, who demonstrated last month against his policies, warning them that they would not be allowed to stir up more trouble and that they would have to express their views in an organized manner.

#### Jarring in Cairo

Meanwhile, both Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Andrei


rived separately in Cairo.

CAIRO, Feb. 18-President | [Jarring refused to answer Anwar Sadat tonight won the reporters' questions about his vote of confidence in his lead- visit but did say he is not

> in Cairo, Reuter reported.] The United States mission Cairo newspaper Ahram, that an American tained for involvement in a CIA spy ring operating in

Informed sources said, however, that a woman member of the U.S. mission had been de-The congress also endorsed tained last year but later re-

[Diplomatic sources in Beiaccepted his argument that rut identified the woman as the timing of the resumption Sue Anne Harris, secretary to Eugene Trone, a U.S. diplomat stationed in Cairo at the time, the Associated Press reported.]



Grechko and the United Na-Approxied For Reliease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000800240001-0 envoy, Gunnar Jarring, ar-

### MIG-23 was target

# Cairo claims U.S. woman was spy

CAIRO (IPI) — A U.S. woman diplomat was caught red-handed and arrested as a spy, an aide to President Anwar Sadat said today.

Mohammed Hassan ≤n Heikal, wriging in his semi-official newspaper Al Ahram, said the unidentified woman, acting with an Egyptian agent for the CIA, was trying to get information on Russia's fighter plane, the MIG-23.

#### SERIOUS INCIDENT

He said the woman's arrest last September created a serious incident with Washington which threatened to discontinue its Middle East political efforts. He indicated the United States later admitted the woman was guilty. She was later released, Mr. Heikal said.

Mr. Heikal said the woman was part of a "gigantic espionage case."

Cairo told Washington at the time the woman would be released only after a thoro investigation, he said, but the United States "persisted in asking for her deportation in accordance with diplomatic tradition.

Washington's persistence turned into pressure. President Sadat dismissed pressure until investigations were complete.

Mr. Heikal said: "Washington then said, supposing there was an espionage case, the operation — assuming it happened — was not aimed against Egypt but against the Soviet Union with which we are engaged in an international struggle.

'Our purpose was to learn something about the new Soviet planes in your country. You can rest assured that nothing of what we have learned will be conveyed to Israel.'"

President Sadat today revealed that two Belgians and a Frenchman were arrested here recently as Israeli agents.

He said the men had milaed thousands of anti-Soviet, anti-Egyptian leaflets in Cairo and had attempted to exploit recent student unrest to "split the name front."

## U.S. Envoy Said to Spy In Egypt

From News Dispatches

CAIRO, Feb. 17—An American women diplomat was arrested here on spy charges late last year, the editor of the influential newspaper Al Ahram said today, Reuter reported.

The woman was not named, and the editor, Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, Gid-not make clear whether she was still being detained.

[A State Department spokesman refused to comment on the report. "We never comment on allegations like that," the spokesman said.]

Heikal said the woman was arrested with an Egyptian man of Greek origin when a "huge spy ring" involving the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency was uncovered.

Heikal said Washington had insisted that the woman be released immediately and repatriated to the United States, but Cairo had replied that investigations must be carried out first.

In a further exchange of messages Heikal wrote, the U.S. government said the alleged espionage was not directed at Egypt but the Soviet Union. The aim was to obtain details on new Soviet aircraft sent to Egypt.

It was not clear when these exchanges took place.

Heikal, in his weekly article for Al Ahram, said the Egyptian, the manager of a large company in Cairo, was the chief defandant in the case.

The Egyptian was not named either. But Heikal said his CIA contact was the American diplomat, who was caught redhanded.

In another espionage case, Washington Post correspondent William Dullforce wrote from Cairo that President Anwar Sadat said today that three Eurpoeans had been arrested for acting as Israeli agents and stirring up trouble during student demonstration in January.

having been recruited by Israeli agents to distribute leaflets among students.

The president also answered questions on Egypt's military capability and the prospects of greater domestic democracy.

Al Ahram reported this morning that the three menarrived in Cairo a few days after the beginning of the student sit-in. Sadat said the leaflets incited the students to overthrow their government, criticized the Soviet Union and praised Sudan for getting rid of its Communists.

Sadat emphasized that the students themselves had been in no way involved in the plans of Israeli intelligence.

The president, who in his opening speech to the special meeting yesterday offered to resign if the people at any time lacked confidence in his leadership, was thanked yesterday evening by a delegation of students from all Egyptian universities for releasing the last of their comrades detained since the January demonstrations.

All indications so far are that Sadat will get the vote of confidence he has been seeking from the national congress which finishes its three-day meeting Friday evening.

[United Press International quoted Cairo's state-controlled newspapers as saying that the council's various committees "expressed full support" for Sadat today. UPI said political sources predicted that the entire membership of the party would endorse the president at the end of the special meeting Friday.]

The end of the meeting will coincide with the arrival in Cairo of Soviet Defense Minister Andrei Grechko and U.N. mediator Gunnar V. Jarring.

An announcement this evening said both visitors were expected to stay two days.

Speaking at a secret session Appropries of the Residual Control of the Residua

Union, Sadat said two Belgians and a Frenchman confessed to

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BIRMINGHAM, ALA.

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## **How Leaders From Mideast** Met In Secret Peace Talks

BY EDWIN ROTH

dramatic ' operations world history was the top- British Egypt around a table in cant that after more than visiting London. London immediately before fifteen years none of the Christmas 1970. It was the three participating govern- had met in London in 1968, first formal Israeli-Arab ments has yet publicly ad- London's Israeli embassy visited Washington, Paris, meeting since the 1949 armis- mitted the historic fact of the had made a planning mis- and Bonn. The main purpose tice talks on the Greek island top-secret conference be- take for which it was not to Rhodes - and it had im tween Israel's Prime Minis blame. Hussein was known to mensely important results, ter David Ben-Gurion, be at London's most expenwhich still exist.

very special position he had Paris suburb Sevres in Octo- be top-secret. held in 1967, had witnessed ber 1956 - which decided the fascinating secret historic Israeli-British-French events - and knows all of Canal war against Egypt. larael's most important state secrets. I asked him whether he could spare the time to meet me for a lengthy talk -Britain.

ing our talk on December 26 weak. not a good poker player, he I didn't speculate.

tellable has now revealed \*hat happened. There are

good reasons why telling the cy. The Central Intelligence lication in Israel, and its story now cannot do any Agency's secret diplomacy transmission abroad by for-News special correspondent harm - though it may be section was told to arrange eign correspondents. But it 16) NDON officially denied until either this conference, which be- was heard by about 250 THE most one of the three governments came one of its most success- ordinary people in the public cloak-and-dagger directly involved, or the U. ful coups. in S. administration, or the

#### Fall of 1970

IN THE FALL of 1970, two research rather immensely important events than journalism" - and we happened in the Middle East, erranged to meet on Decem-King Hussein of Jordan won ber 26, which is a holiday in his civil war against the Palestinian guerrillas, and I knew then that Israel's his throne—probably also his foreign minister Abba Eban life — was saved by Israel's and King Hussein of Jordan concentration of mobilized had been in London at the armored and infantry forces. \*ame time immediately be- in Northern Israel, which fore Christmas, and mention caused the invading Syrian ed recent stories about earli- tanks to withdraw from Jormeetings between Eban dan. In Egypt, Gamal Abdel and Hussein. The Israeli to Nasser died, and his successhom I mentioned this dur- sor Anwar Sadat was very

President Richard Nixon

government, will venue, because King Hussein knew it within 48 hours. level peace conference be-want to release it officially, and Abba Eban could find tween Israel, Jordan, and In this context, it is signifi- good ostensible reasons for

When Eban and Hussein Israel's Chief-of-Staff Gener- sive private hospital, the ence with Eban and Mah-A few days before Christ- al Moshe Dayan, France's London Clinic, where he was mas 1970, I met by chance in Prime Minister Guy Mollet, treated for his chronic nose a. London restaurant an and Britain's Foreign Secre- ailment. Eban's visit to Lon- previous meetings with Eban Israeli who, because of the tary Selwyn Lloyd in the don at the same time was to and Allon.

> Suez London airport, he walked by chance into a crowd of news their safety. Hussein had not media representatives wait- met his family since June. ing for another news person. To ensure maximum press ality - and was recognized and TV coverage. Hussein's by them. He told them he two-year-old twin daughters had come privately to see his mother who lives here, but by their British-born mother his arrival got publicity Princess Muna, and all posed which he and Hussein had for happy family pictures. wanted to avoid.

for the London meeting in ON DECEMBER 4. Hus-

There was an additional and I could see that my and Secretary of State Wilder diplomatic safeguard. Early On December 7, Hussein femarks worried him very liam Rogers wanted to avert in November 1970, the Island Brossident Nivon and Middle the Island and President Nivon and Island the Isl wich. He suggested that any the danger of a new Middle government leaked the story met President Nixon — and As remalistic speculation about East war by bringing top-lev- of the dramatic meeting be got much publicity. Then he might do tremendous el representatives of Israel, tween Hussein and Israel's flew to Paris, where he met harm, and cost many lives. Jordan, and Egypt to the deputy prime minister Yigal President Pompidou — and same table — which could be Allon in a car in Israel's got much publicity. Then he

member of Israel's parliament, a fierce opposition leftist. As expected, he asked parliamentary question about it on November 9.

This parliamentary question was disallowed for security reasons, and security censorship prevented its pubgallery. In Israel, this meant London was chosen as the that the entire population

> On December 3. King Hussein arrived in London at the start of a western capitals tour during which he also of this tour was to provide camouflage for the coming London Christmas confermoud Riad. Throughout it. he denied the story of his

But when Eban arrived at children had been living in Britain since the summer for were taken to London airport.

#### The ingenious camouflage Hussein meets Heath


Christmas Week 1970 be- sein very publicly met Brittween Eban, Hussein, and ain's Prime Minister Ed-Egypt's Foreign Minister ward Heath. On the same Mahmoud Riad was to be day, the British Foreign Ofthat Eban's and Hussein's fice announced that he would movements before the con- return to London on Decemference would be enormously ber 20 for further talks with Britain's Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home,


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### Approved Por Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000800240001-0

THE LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH MAGAZINE





### MEDWEETEFETEEDELT SWOGERMED TO TO TO TO THE OUT OF THE PORT OF THE



#### STATINTL

An analysis of the work of the Central Intelligence Agency begins on page 10. The compiler of this three-part report is E. H. Cookridge (left), who is the author of 16 books on espionage. Recruited into the British Secret Service on graduating from the University of Vienna in 1934, he has spent his time ever since in intelligence work, or writing about it. "I am in the position of the dumb blonde in Hollywood films. Once you are it you cannot stop. I am tired of writing about spies." But his network of contacts built up over the years is

unique; and ensures that he will be

The Biggest Secret Service in the World.

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NOV 29 1971



## Arab Hijackings Hide Red Theft

LONDON (AP).—The Arab skyjacking of four Western airliners last year was part of a worldwide Communist plot that delivered secret Atlantic Alliance documents to the Soviet Union, a British spy book

claimed Monday.

Pouches containing secret reports on a NATO airsea exercise and the military budget were taken off the planes before they were blown up at Cairo airport and in the sands of the Jordanian desert, says "Spy Trade," by Edward H. Cookridge, a Vienna-born espionage specialist.

The September skyjackingsand a fifth attempt which failed in a blaze of gunfire above the English Channelflashed the world spotlight on the Arab guerillas of the Marxist-Maoist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, who did the job. The organization has now virtually vanished from the Arab scene.

The air piracy had little to do with Arab nationalism, claimed "Spy Trade," which contended: "It was, in fact, part of a worldwide Communist conspiracy, although not necessarily stage-managed from Moscow.

"Hardly any of the actual skyjackers were Palestinians or Arabs," said Cookridge.

The book is likely to provoke Arab denials from the Middle East, where the skyjackers are regarded as Palestinian heroes and bonafide Arabs.

Two of the air bandits were Africans from Senegal, said Cookridge, a World War II intelligence agent and author of half a dozen books on spying.

Another was Miss Cecilia

Martinez Fernandez from Colombia. A fourth was a Costa Rican student, Alvara Fuentes Iglesias, the book

Even Leila Khaled, the girl guerilla briefly jailed in Britain after she failed to capture an Israeli El Al plane over the English Channel, may have been born in Honduras, Cookridge indicated. The name on her passport, he said, was Maria de la Lux Chaves, and she speaks Spanish.

Leila's accomplice, shot dead b, Israeli security guards while the plane was in flight, was Nicaraguan-born Patrick Anguello, an American citizen.

"He had nothing to do with Arab nationalism . . . he was professional Communist agent and his involvement with the PFLP was only incidental," the book says.

Cookridge did not specify the precise purposes of the alleged Communist plot. But he said one effect of the hijacking was the seizure of the secret NATO papers.

From a Pan American Air-

## Plot, Expert Saus

ways jumbo jet, hijacked to canceled. Cairo on a Sept. 7 flight from Amsterdam to New York, "they captured a mass of NATO documents concerning top-secret plans for the combined NATO air and naval exercises code-named 'Wintex'," set for 1971, said Cookridge.

The Central Intelligence had been delivered to Col. Samih Sharraf, the Egyptian intelligence chief, and given to the Soviet Embassy in Cairo.

The papers were photographed and the pouches slashed and burned to resemble explosion damage. Then they were delivered to the American Embassy in Cairo with formal Egyptian regrets. The maneuvers Wintex

From a Trans World Airlines 707, hijacked and blown up in Jordan, the skyjackers' took NATO documents en route from Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) to the Pentagon in Washington, the book said.

covered that the Wintex plans Cookridge Cookridge Cookridge comments: "It was a good catch: They contained a complete set of documents of the NATO military budget for 1971."

"The great skyjack operation of September 1970, is already half forgotten," cautioned Cookridge. He warned that "in the area of intelligence and military limbs of government the drama remains an ominous pointer to were the future."

#### \_Approved For Relea**se 2001/103/04**5©CIA-RDP8

\_1 NOV. 1971

### Revealing and Chilling'

# A Breathtaking Biography of Gamal Abdel Nasser

By Chalmers M. Roberts

ITEM: On June 23, 1965, Chou Endai told Gamal Abdel Nasser over dinner in Cairo that he did not want President Johnson to withdraw troops from Vietnam; rather, hc wanted more Americans sent there. Why? Because "we are afraid that some American militarists may press for a nuclear attack on China" and therefore American involvement would be "an insurance policy against an attack" because the U.S. troops would be "so close to us they will be our hostages."

Item: In 1959 Nikita Khrushchev wrote Gamal Abdel Nasser that the Soviet Union had "feared" a year earlier to offer unlimited support to Egypt—"knowing your impulsiveness." In 1937, just before the Six Day War, Alexel Kosygin counseled Egypt to "compromise, to work politically" after Nasser had closed the Straits of Tiran.

Item: Nasser had an "instinctive dislike" for President Johnson because he had studied photographs of the new American President and was "shocked" at those in which Johnson had his feet on his desk and was showing off his operation sear. When the Soviet ambassador arrived in the middle of the night to deliver a Johnson message sent via Kosygin, Nasser took it as an effort to "neutralize" the Soviet Union in the Middle East.

THESE FRAGMENTS, and much more, are to be found in a forthcoming biography of Nasser by his friend and confidant, Mohammed Heikal, the highly influential editor of Cairo's Al Ahram. Excerpts from the book, to be published next year, have been running for some weeks in the London Sunday Telegraph. The items mentioned here are from those excerpts and while some of Heikal's reporting may be open to question, much of it has the ring of truth.

Of all the middle rank nations none has had greater importance for and influence on the superpowers than Egypt. Heikal's account is both revealing and chilling. It is revealing because it includes much new information on the Soviet attitude toward Egypt as well as some details of Kennedy and Johnson diplomacy in the Middle East plus a great deal about inter-Arab relationships. It is chilling because Heikal suggests that a sense of conspiracy and emotion rather than hard facts and analysis governed Nasser's critical decisions. What this implies for the current Sadat regime can only be guessed. Heikal's role today is as important as it was in Nasser's years.

What, for example, is one to believe about the tales of CIA intrigue recounted by Heikal? He writes of a CIA "leak" to Nasser that at the time of Suez, Anthony Eden was suffering a physical breakdown; of \$3 million paid by the CIA to Gen. Naguib to construct a communications tower in Cairo; of how the CIA induced a Russian sailor on a Soviet ship bringing the first arms to Egypt to defect and now the sailor was shipped out and how Americans, unnamed, tipped Egypt sent them to a commune.

THERE is an intriguing account of the ori- Heikal also recounts that China strongly gin of the 1955 Soviet arms deal, one of the opposed Nasser's acceptance of the ceasemonumental events of our times. As Helkal fire after the Six Day War in 1957. Mao, retells it, President Eisenhower was talked out ports Heikal, "sent Nasser a military plan of aiding Egypt by Prime Minister Churchill of action" that called for breaking up the though John Foster Dulles was sympathetic Egyption army into guerilla brigades "which to Nasser's request. But when Dulles tem-should lose themselves in the population." porized and worried about Nasser going to Nasser had to explain to the Chinese that the Bandung Conference, it was Chou En-lai the Sinai was no place for such tactics "but who set up the deal. At a stop in Rangoon still the Chinese were not convinced." en route to Bandung, Nehru introduced Nasser to Chou, and Nasser asked the Chinese Premier if he thought Moscow would supply him with arms. This, writes Heikal, was the "first overture of the Soviet arms deal."

The result was a call on Nasser by the Soviet ambassador in Cairo on May 21, 1955, and later a visit by a Russian colonel. Heikal says that Nasser told American Ambassador Byroade on May 22 that he had a firm Soviet offer. But Dulles was later to claim he had no solid information prior to the sum-Bulganin and Krushchev at Geneva.

the American troop involvement on a grand thing more than that." scale was only just beginning—that "the realizes."

of Chou's remarks but not about the drugs. It was, says Heikal, the only time in the two-hour Nasser-Harriman meeting that the American "showed any real interest" in the

Chou's bitterness toward the Soviet Union also is deeply reflected in the Heikal account. When Nasser said the Soviets were helping Egypt, Chou replied that "they are not going to help you. They are only interested in helping themselves." The Russians complained that Nasser was getting too friendly with China and an unnamed Russian leader, says Heikal, recounted an "insult" to the Soviet Union: Mao Tse-tung had sent his two sons to Moscow for training but when they returned to China, Mao asked what they had learned and when they

There also is an account of a Nasserordaed mission to Peking around this time to ask for Chinese help "in making a breakthrough in nuclear techniques," as Heikal describes it. Chou received the delegation kindly but explained that "nobody was going to give anybody anything as a gift. If the Egyptians wanted to step into the atomic field they would have to do it themselves" as China had done.

How much Heikal will disclose of Kosymit conference that July and therefore Ei- gin's diplomacy remains to be seen but there senhower had not raised the matter with is plenty about Khrushchev's way of doing business. There is, for example, his remark The Oct. 17 installment included state to Nasser that Tito is "not a Communist, he ments by Chou to Nasser in 1985 that some is a king." More chilling is Khrushchev's American troops were beginning to try statement to Nasser in the Kremlin in 1958, opium "and we are helping them" by "plant- just after the coup in Iraq, when the Arab ing the best kinds of opium especially for world expected an American invasion of the American soldiers in Vietnam." Chou, Iraq, that "frankly, we are not ready for a. as Heikal tels it in direct quotations, ex. confrontation. We are not ready for World plained that the West had long ago imposed War III." The most Khrushchev would opium on China and "we are going to fight promise by way of help to the Arabs was to them with their own weapons." Prophetical announce Soviet maneuvers on the Bulgarily, Chou added-and this was in 1965 when an Turkish border "but don't depend on any-

Nasser would not accept the idea of Israeeffect which this demoralization" through li collusion with Britain and France in 1956 drugs "is going to have" on the United though his Paris embassy had paid an un-States "will be far greater than anyone named Frenchman for just such advance information. By the time of the Six Day War, Heikal reports that Nasser subsequently however, Nasser was ready to believe in told Averell Harriman of the first part American collusion with Israel. As Heikal tells it, what convinced Nasser was an overflight of two American planes and a Johnson message via Kosygin delivered by the Soviet ambassador that the planes were on their way to help the American spy ship Liberty. Nasser even was affected by an American press account that President Johnson had remarked to his wife that "we have a war on our hands," "We" was equated with collusion.

of Egypt in a diplomatic bag; of Kermit told him Nao declared that "it was all non-Roosevelt's well Approved For Release 2001/03/04 leach - RDR 80-01 601R000800240001-0

that the British had named a commander for the 1956 invacion

1 3 SEP 1971

#### NEWSPAPER REOPENS EGYPTIAN SPY CASE

Special to The New York Times


BEÍRUT, Lebanon, Sept. 12-An Egyptian editor, now serving life imprisonment for spy-ing for the United States, has stated that he was falsely accused by a former Egyptian in-telligence chief and that he had kept in touch with the Americans because the late President, Gamel Abdel Nasser( asked him for information about activities by the United States Embassy in Cairo.

A leading newspaper here,
Al Anwar, today reopened the
case of Mustafa Amin, the
founder of Cairo's prominent
Akhbar Al Yom publishing Akhbar Al Yom publishing house, who was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1965 after being found guilty of providing the United States Central Intelligence Agency with secret information bearing on Egyptian security.

Al Anwar, which now employs Mr. Amin's twin brother, Ali printed the text of a letter that Mr. Amin sent to President Nasser in December, 1965, pleading his innocence and accusing the intelligence chief at

cusing the intelligence chief at the time, Salah Naser, of sub-jecting to torture. The message, however, never reached the President.

President.
The letter suggested that Mr. Naser falsely accused Mr. Amin after hearing that President Nasser intended to make him the new intelligence chief. Mr. Naser himself is now serving a 15-year prison sentence. He was convicted by a Cairo military court after the six-day war with Israel in 1967 as implicated in a conspiracy to overthrow President Nasser overthrow President Nasser-



WHILE President Nasser of Egypt was alive [writes of this combination of the GORDON BROOK-SHEPHERD] Mohammed Heikal the verbal and the documentary—is an historic experience the like of which a year after the Arab leader's death, that Nasser for the has not been seen since the great post-first time speaks to the world through Heikal's lips.

The result of this combination of micute and original Nasser material—the verbal and the documentary—is an historic experience the like of which was memoirs of a generation ago. This was memoirs of a generation ago. This

What The Sunday Telegraph is publishing this week, and is life at the top table in the 1950s in the weeks to come is no outsider's biography of the late and 1960s. It is described not by sometime the president. Nor is it one of those so-called inside body listening and peeping through the constructed around climings and intermediate the constructed around climings. stories constructed around clippings and interviews with those who claim to know him. Heikal's account is built on Nasser's himself.

own story, told largely in Nasser's own words, of the dramas,
setbacks and triumphs of his 17 tempestuous years on the
Nasser international stage.

As one of his closest friends and advisers, and also as his natural biographer, Heikal was at Nasser's side, in Egypt and abroad, at nearly all the critical moments of his career. How Nasser fought, how he reacted, and what he said, was recorded on the spet by Heikal and the

recorded on the spot by Heikal. And the words reproduced today are as Nasser

spoke them then.

Nor is this all. Heikai has been able to draw on the records of Nasser's Revolutionary Council meetings, on the secret telegrams of his Ambassadors in the key capitals of the world, and even on the personal correspondence which Nasser conducted with other world leaders.

The actual texts of such correspondence-with, for example, Chairman Khruschev, President Kennedy, President Johnson and Prime Minister Chou En-lai—will be given in these from Heikal's exclusive extracts forthcoming book.

These letters are far from protocol platitudes. Som Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000800240001-0 one or two downlight angry.

the keyhole, but by one who sat there

So much is new in this Heikal-Nasser story that it is hard to be selective. But perhaps two features of the material stand out. One, which will interest particularly the British reader, is that it contains the first authoritative account ever to appear of the 1956 Suez crisis as seen from the Egyptian side. English, French, Israeli statesmen, and American

soldiers and diplomatists have all produced their versions. Now, not just an Egyptian version, but Nasser's own.

It contains many surprises, quite a few shocks, and, whatever one's views may be, much food for thought.

The second outstanding feature is inherent in the way the tale is told. It is not a dry, chronological history but a series of vivid portraits of other world

### Approved For Release 2001/03/040 CIA RDP80-01601

STATINTL

22 AUGUST 1971

## The Second Most

## Important Mam im Egypt-

and possibly the world's most powerful journalist

by Edward R. F. Smeeman

CATRO.

built man whose dark face and cool brown eyes exude a self-assurance that can sometimes hint of arrogance. Perfectly tailored in an American-style business suit, he sits silently in his sumptuous office behind an immense, immaculate desk, puffing on a Cuban cigar, encouraging you to do all of the talking as he measures you in his mind and calculates how he wishes to respond. When finally he begins to talk, his replies are torrential. "All that I am. I owe to the history of Egypt..."

He was the late Gamal Abdel Nasser's alter ego, and now he is President Anwar Sadat's éminence grise. His writings are devoured by Arabs from the casbabs of Morocco to the oil derricks of the Persian Gulf, and by diplomats from Foggy Bottom to Peking, for auguries of events to come in the convulsive Middle East. He is Muhammed Hassanein Heikal, editor of Al Ahram, and perhaps the most powerful journalist in the world.

When Heikal visited London. recently to sell his still unfinished book on Nasser to the Western press, he was received almost like a chief of state. He lunched at the Foreign Office, then motored to 10 Downing Street for a chat with Prime Minister Edward Heath on prospects for. peace between Egypt and Israel. The bidding for his book on Nasser was intense; in the end he sold the world rights to The Sunday Telegraph for 100,000 pounds sterling. The Telegraph is the most conservative of Britain's quality newspapers, and Nasser had been its bête noire for 15 years, but the decision was typical of Heikal's political acumen (no sense preaching to the converted), his business ability and his sense of humor.

T home, Heikal is Egypt's most eminent propagandist and the anointed prophet of Nasserism. His long, weekly editorial, "Frankly Speaking," though sometimes turgid

EDWARD R. F. SHEEHAN is a Parisbased novelist ("The Governor"), journalist and former press officer in the American Embassy in Cairo.

and repetitious, is read by millions for its continuing exegesis of Nasser's thought, just as the news columns of Al Ahram are the most informative source of what is happening in Egypt and the clearest index of, President Sadat's policies at any given moment. Le Monde, the B.B.C., The New York Times and the entire Arab press quote Heikal regularly and at length, since they know that he not only enunciates Egyptian policy, he sometimes inspires it.

Heikal's influence on Sadat may be even greater than it was on Nasser; he helps the President to formulate crucial decisions in domestic and foreign affairs, and he played a key role in advising Sadat how to foil the recent conspiracy mounted against him by five of his own ministers. Heikal ingenuously denies such influence ("I simply talk to the President without inhibitions," he says), but in fact after Sadat he may now be the most important man in Egypt.

Though he served as Minister of Information for six months last year (at Nasser's insistence), Heikal has always resisted the burdens of office; he prefers influence without formal responsibility. Otherwise, he relishes all the rewards of wielding power. He is vain, emotional, amusing, quick-witted, cunning, vulnerable to flattery, and a perceptive judge of men. Prominent journalists from the West beseige his door, seeking audiences with him and

President Sadat; disdainfully he instructs his secretaries to send most of them away, though he knows better than they do that without his blessing the President will not see them; it was the same while Nasser lived.

Curiously, Heikal agrees to see me. His inner sanctum seems almost James Bondish, a huge, dark-paneled place where he sits among tape recorders and buttons at his fingertips; when touched, they activate sliding panels and emerging television screens. He talks on; I scribble away; his telephone buzzes sweetly. "Would you mind stepping outside for a few minutes?" he smiles, speaking in perfect English. "The President wishes to talk to me." As I close the door, I can hear Heikal greeting Sadat with a burst of uproarious pleasantries.

EIKAL'S significance is not confined to his counsel behind the throne; he has become as well the catalyst of a growing debate whichconcerns the whole future of Egyptian society. Many of Egypt's thinkers used to plead that their society could not be radically improved before the confrontation with Israel was resolved. Heikal has dumped that argument upside down, insisting in his column that Egypt can never face up to the Israeli challenge unless it overcomes its own backwardness-and that to accomplish that it must create an open society, animated by the rule of law, endowed with democratic institutions, and freed of most of the police-state restraints that have burdened the country for the last 19 years. With a truly democratic system, Heikal's argument runs, Egypt would not have been defeated by Israel in 1967. Moreover, until the whole society is changed, through

### Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-0



By John IX. Cooloy

Beirut, Lebanon

the editor of several of Beirut's 40-odd newsover the morning's quota of junk mail.

His alert secretary had spotted and set conference in Singapore. aside a brochure printed in neat blue type. It carried a halitone photograph of U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers.

The editor buzzed his secretary. "Haven't we seen this before?" he asked her. It was a collection of Secretary Rogers's speeches suggesting an honorable Arab-Israeli compromise in the Middle East conflict.

The secretary shrugged. "The American Embassy addressograph machine must be mixed up," she said. "We had a copy of this two months ago."

The editor's hand stopped halfway to the

The first few paragraphs of Secretary Rogers's speeches were identical in each. But in the second brochure, some changes had been made.

#### Giveaway was crude

Sentences were rearranged. New words were inserted. The message that carrie United States wants Israel always to impose its own terms on the defeated Arabs."

Just the thing to make an Arab editor's blood boil, angrily or jubilantly depending on his own sentiments toward the United States, on a hot Beirut day.

The only really crude touch, the giveaway that this was a fake, came at the very end of brochure No. 2: "Our final goal," Secretary Rogers was quoted as saying, "is always the world supremacy of the United States."

This particular specimen of what came to be known in World War II as "black propaganda," falsifying in rumor, writing, print, or breadcast something purported to come

from an adversary (or sometimes a friend) to make him look bad, was technically well done, like other doctored pamphlets, books, and tape recordings floating around the Middle East. It had even been printed, apparently, on the same press as the original.

As with countless other black prepaganda specimens, no one may ever know for sure.

Sometimes black, or its more subtle cousin, gray, propaganda can be truly explosive. Last winter, London's Scotland Yard picked up copies of a curious pornographic book called "Turkish Love in Pictures."

Sprinkled with snide allusions to the prophet Muhammad and the delights of the Muslim paradise, the book, bearing a London imprint, had begun turning up in the Middle East.

Pakistani students were shocked and One hot summer morning not long ago, puzzled to find it in Karachi bookstalls shortly before the scheduled stopover of papers and newsmagazines cast a bored eye British Prime Minister Edward Heath on his way to attend the January Commonwealth

> After a long look through their strongest reading glasses, British Foreign Office experts recalled how an earlier irreverent book about the Prophet Muhammad had touched off riots in Pakistan and India. They concluded this was an effort by someone to stir up serious troubles during Prime Minister Heath's passage, and perhaps disrupt the Singapore meeting, where many Muslims would be present.

#### Page from Western book

If black and gray propaganda has helped wastebasket. An indefinable something to darken the Middle East's horizons, Westabout the brochure caught his eye. He sent ern governments may have largely themfor the old copy from the file. Sure enough, selves to thank. In the early 1950's, U.S. there was something wrong with the new agencies delegated several American psychological-wariare experts to President Nasser of Egypt, with whom Washington was then on good terms.

Miles Copeland, once connected with Central Intelligence Agency operations in the Middle East, describes in his book "The Game of Nations" how the CIA chief in Egypt in 1954 circulated "pre-First World War books with titles like 'Muhammad through now was something like: "The Never Existed," The Harmful Consequences of Fasting in Ramadan,' and 'Against the Veil,' while attributing the distribution to the Soviet Embassy."

The games that nations, and people, play tend to persist as permanent pastimes.

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## CIA Activity In Mideast Flas Arobs Worried

BY GEORGE WELLER

01971, Chicago Daily News Don't look now, but a sudden surplus of spies is spurting out of the sands of the

Middle East. Never, or hardly ever, have so many famous spooks become so easily noticeable. It must be a new trend in open spying, because stealthy it ain't.

The highest profile is that of Richard C. Helms, the tall, articulate director of the CIA. He is visiting Israel with a timing and candor that has the Arabs worried, but not surprised.

The CIA predicted accurately the Israeli attack on Egypt in June, 1957. Helms can be positioning himself to score

again, some observers think.

To test the timing of the Egyptian attack publicly predicted by President Anwar Sadat, Helms must visit Egypt, too. There, by the Nile, stands the tallest, costliest menument ever built to misfire espionage: The Cairo observation tower, shaped like a dandelion, over 20 stories high.

Offered Secret Gift

In the mid-'50s the CIA, con-. fident that any Arab could be bought, offered U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser a secret \$3 million gift as his personal consolation for heavy U.S. governmental aid to Is-

Instead of pocketing the gift or sending it to Switzerland for secret deposit, Nasser kept his status uncommitted and indulged his sense of private humor by building the tower. Like the Sphinx, he smiled, but he never squealed.

The other CIA spy winning Mideast attention is witty, skeptical Miles Copeland, a

was the CIA "station manager" in Cairo who delivered the lavish bribe to Nasser's residence, minus \$10 subtracted by a light-fingered Lebanese bankteller.

'Gamma Project'

Copeland, no longer officially CIA but still worth bugging, reveals in the London Times this week the "gamma project," a secret CIA stratagem that was intended to bring together a dollar-lubricated Nasser and Israel's patriarchal leader David Ben-Gurien.

When "gamma" was devised in 1955, as now, the American government was convinced that peace in the Middle East was mainly a matter of getting opposing leaders to sit down together and haggle. Israel still supports this view, but the Arabs consider any direct parley an Israeli subterfuge to gain recognition.

As Copeland tells the CIA / sia in 1937. plan, he and Kermit Roosevelt undertook to push for "a series of talks with Nasser to arrive at a basic negotiation. bly on the fact that a large position to confront Ben-Gurion."

to contact the Israeli leader, while President Eisenhower's financial adviser, Robert Anderson, later secretary of the treasury, was to "fly back and forth between Cairo and Tel Aviv."

The CIA's "gamma" failed, according to Copeland, be-cause Ben-Gurion "flatly refused" to talk peace terms

with Anderson. He told Eisenhower's middleman sharply: "Your job is to bring about a meeting between Nasser and myself. If I am going to make any concessions it will be to Nasser and no one else."

The third snooper is Russia's Victor Louis, the wealthy Moscow correspondent of The London News. Louis is generally considered to be a Soviet secret police agent. He has a British wife, three cars, a dasha or country estate, a collection of icons, and freedom to move as he will.

He stayed in Israel recently at the hospital run by Dr. Arye Harel, who was Israel's Moscow ambassador in 1959-

The presumption Louis is a secret police agent comes from the kind of security material he is allowed to send: Nikita Khrushehev's downfall, the death of the spy Gordon Lonsdale, the release of the writer Andrei Sinyavski, and the shots at the astronauts by a would-be assassin (actually aiming at party secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, which Louis was not allowed to say).

The visit of Louis, it is believed, was due more to getting a new working agreement on the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel than to renewing the relations between the two countries severed by Rus-

The London Times says: "He is thought to be Jewish - an assumption based possinumber of KGB (secret police) men are Jews, dating Two other Americans were from NKVD (former secret police) days."

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### Approved Ap

## Israel-The 51st State?

#### By DAVID G. NES

OWINGS MILLS, Md.—A Middle East settlement as envisaged in U.N. Resolution 242 will depend very largely upon the degree of influence the U.S. is willing to apply to persuade Israel that her ultimate survival depends on acceptance by her neighbors and international guarantees, rather than on any specific frontiers secured by continuing military superiority.

All reports from our diplomatic missions abroad indicate that the world community—including Britain, France, and our other NATO allies—look to the United States to exercise toward this end the leverage inherent in our "special relationship" with Israel. A full understanding of this relationship is essential in considering the great responsibility Secretary of State Rogers has borne in his attempts to achieve an Arab-Israeli negotiated settlement.

When President Truman said in October of 1948. "We are pledged to a State of Israel, large enough, free enough, and strong enough to make its people self-supporting and secure," the stage was set for the gradual establishment of an association between the U.S. and another country unique in our history. Today, that association is far closer in all areas-defense, economic collaboration, intelligence ex-· change, common citizenship, and mutual diplomatic support than enjoyed, for example, between the U.S. and Great Britain. Unique also is Israel's almost total immunity from criticism in this country.

In dollars and cents, our assistance to Israel through the years, both governmental and private, has been prodigious. During the period between 1948-1969, United States Government economic aid totaled \$1.3 billion, while dollar transfers from private sources amounted to \$2.5 billion, a total of \$3.8 billion, or \$1,500 per capita on a current population of 2.5 million. This greatly exceeds, on a per capita basis, our assistance to any ally and compares to \$35 per capita to the peoples of thirteen neighboring states. Since 1969, our assistance to Israel has greatly increased. Dollar transfers in

1970 reached \$800 million and in 1971, will approximate \$1.5 billion. A further increase is anticipated for 1972.

Until 1967, we assured Israel a continuing supply of modern military equipment through West Germany and France and thus were able to avoid Arab hostility on this score. However, with the conclusion of German "reparations" and de Gaulle's change in Middle East policy, we have—since 1967—become the exclusive purveyor of arms to Israel. Of greater significance is the fact that qualitatively, we have provided aircraft, missiles, and electronic systems in some cases of greater sophistication and greater strike-capability than those furnished our NATO and SEATO allies.

A few months ago, the House of Representatives passed an amendment to the Defense Procurement Bill giving the President "open-ended" authority to transfer military equipment to Israel without total cost limitation. As former House Speaker McCormack remarked, "... I have never seen in my 42 years as a member of this body, language of this kind. . . . " The Senate on Dec. 15 last, by a sixty-to-twenty vote, killed the Williams' amendment to the Defense Appropriations Bill which would have restricted the President-as with Cambodia-from sending U.S. troops into Israel without Congressional permission.

In the area of nuclear weaponry, the United States has also pursued an exceptional position vis-à-vis Israel. During the years when we were pressing over one hundred nations in the world community with whatever diplomatic, economic and military leverage we might have to adhere to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, lerael alone was exempted from strong representations. Meanwhile, Israel reportedly has produced nuclear weapons designed for Phantom aircraft delivery.

In the exchange of intelligence, our cooperation with Israel is unprecedented. During the months prior to the June 1967 hostilities, the military intelligence requirements levied by Washington upon the Cairo Embassy, C.I.A. and military intelligence staffs were very largely based on Israeli

needs. The effectiveness of the Israeli air strikes on June 5, 1967, was assured in part, at least, by information on Egyptian air fields and aircraft disposition provided through U.S. sources. With respect to political and economic information, it was State Department practice at that time to provide the Israeli embassy in Washington with copies of those Middle East embassy reports considered of interest.

On the question of dual citizenship, Israel also enjoys an exceptional position. Under the Israel Law of Return, an American Jew entering Israel for permanent residence is automatically extended Israeli nationality. Consequently, there are now some 25,000 residents of Israel who possess both American and Israel citzenship and are entitled to the protection of the United States Government in the event of war.

Last summer, in a series of White. House statements, we would seem to have extended our commitments to Israel to include the "occupied territories," her continued military superiority, and the preservation of her "Jewish character."

Only history can render a total explanation for this very special U.S. Israel relationship. Suffice to say, it has now reached a point where Israel's security and welfare is not only considered vital to our own, but where our reaction to its possible compromise is more intense than would be evident with any of our NATO or SEATO allies. In essence, Israel has become our 51st state. As one State Department wag put it, "Were Israel's survival to be seriously threatened, we would be in World War III in two minutes—with Berlin, it might take several days!"

It is because of this frightening reality that the Administration has assumed world leadership in seeking a negotiated settlement, and Secretary Rogers has been concentrating on reopening the Suez Canal as a first step.

David G. Nes, now retired from a Foreign Service with the personal reservice for Minister, was charge d'affaires the Cairo before and during the June war of 1967.

## THEWORLD

## International Report

## A lasso of sad garlands to catch Nasser's heir

FROM OUR BEIRUT CORRESPONDENT

Official and non-official reactions in other Arab countries to the coup in Egypt are at one in expressing regret for what has happened and a wariness at what may yet come. Arab public opinion, which is generally anti-American, is upset at the apparent victory of President Sadat, who seems too blatantly pro-American. Arab leftists, both communist and non-communist, are naturally convinced that the whole affair is a Central Intelligence Agency plot and that if Sadat falls because of the inevitable failure of the American peace initiative he will be replaced by someone still more pro-American.

The Arab governments are bound to accept whoever manages to keep hold of power in Cairo. Several governments are especially happy to see the backs of the two intelligence chiefs, Mr Sharawi Gomaa and Mr Sami Sharaf, whom they suspected of interfering in their own backyards. But at both government and popular level there is a feeling of real sadness that the few remaining old comrades of President Nasser should now be savaging each other, and a more impersonal regret that the one stable Arab country of recent years will be an uncertain factor for at least some time to come.

Arab wariness about the future springs from the surprised realisation that in Arab affairs President Sadat has far more freedom of initiative than Nasser ever had because Nasser was to some extent the captive of his role as a pan-Arab leader. Sadat owes no debt to history and has no obligation to public opinion to produce unfailingly the grand heroic gesture. In political terms he is self-sufficient. The fear is that he might independently take Egypt into a Nilotic isolationism.

One striking feature of Arab editorial comment is the unanimity

with which it emphasises that Egypt remains the largest, most important and leading Arab country. It is almost as if the leader-writers were trying to lasso Egypt with garlands to prevent it from turning its back on its smaller neighbours. Even inconspicuous signs of incipient isolationism are being picked out. Thus it was noted that the delegations from Sudan, Syria and Libya who went to Cairo with anxious inquiries were handled with brisk dismissiveness and were on their way home in a matter of hours. But this was evidently enough time for them to be reassured, because all three countries have come out in full support of the new Sadat regime. The one Arab country that has been openly critical is Iraq, which carries on its millennial feud with Egypt irrespective of who is master in Cairo.

Despite the gloomy suspicions of Arab leftists, the emergence of President Sadat's new regime does not seem to alter very markedly the familiar line-up in the Arab world of the pro-Russians and the pro-Americans, of the "progressives" and the "reactionaries." This is so because Egypt had already moved into a middle position between the two big powers when Nasser accepted Mr Rogers's proposals.

One nasserist initiative which still binds President Sadat is the tripartite alliance between Egypt, Libya and Syria. The fact that his opponents in Egypt seized on this as an issue on which they could put him into a minority might help to convince the president that the federation is genuinely unpopular with Egyptians. There are three months to go before this unrealistic project is supposed to spring to life, and it would not be too surprising if President Sadat let it wither on the vine.

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### TACTS, RUMORS

## Moscow's Influence In Cairo Still Unclear

By GEORGE SHERMAN Star Staff Writer

A much-discused question among outsiders in Egypt these days is exactly how much influence the Russians have over Gamal Abdel Nasser's successors.

No one really knows the answers. Tidbits of facts, mixed with healthy doses of rumor, point in both directions. Wishful thinking more often than not colors the conclusions of most expert observers.

For instance, Soviet military influence would appear to be supreme. It is as evident as the supersonic MIG jet fighter-bombers roaring over the landscape, or the barely disguised SAM sites occasionally visible to expert eyes along the road to the Suez Canal, or the stone reinforced bridges across desert gulleys to carry the new Soviet medium-range ground-to-ground missiles.

Ninety-nine percent of Egyptian military equipment is now Soviet-supplied. Western intelligence has pinpointed two, and possibly three, exclusively Soviet air bases outside Cairo. Soviet warships have free use of the ports of Alexandria and Port Said.

U.S. sources put the number of Soviet troops all over Egypt at 10,000. Israeli sources in Tel Aviv go higher — 15,000 to 18,000 men, they say, only one-third of them advisers, training officers and military

experts.

Though physical operation of the 190 SAM sites—in the canal zone, and around Alexandria, Cairo and the Aswan dam—appears to be in Egyptian hands now, intelligence points to Soviet "advisers" remaining to operate the complicated radar system at each site.

All in all, that spells a pretty massive military involvement. Its relation to Egyptian foreign policy was dramatized last week, when President Anwar Sadat made a hurried and secret 36-hour visit to Moscow before announcing his latest tactic on the coase-fire along the Suez Canal.

Yet, this Soviet devotion to Egypt, and the unstinting official praise it earlies in Carro, is not quite convincing — not convincing, that is, to outsid-

George Sherman, The Star's State
Department reporter, recently returned from a five-week trip
through Europe and the Middle East.

tian man-in-the-street. The feeling and the form of Egyptian independence remain, even if its substance has been somewhat compromised.

Reports circulate that the Egyptian officer class has growing disdain for the Russians, partly because of Soviet tutelage, but mostly because all the Soviet aid and advice have still not produced a military advantage for Egypt overthe Israeli enemy.

#### Dreary Reports

No attuned observer in Cairo doubts that Moscow has urged restraint, in the sure knowledge that another Egyptian defeat will drag Russian forces into the battle and a possible confrontation with the United States.

A top Jordanian military mission, invited to Cairo just before the supposed expiration of the cease-fire on Feb. 5, brought dreary reports to Amman. The Jordanian generals, supposedly in Egypt to coordinate "eastern front" action against Israel after the cease-fire, found the Egyptian generals privately scornful of the Russians and anxious to find "an opening" to the Americans.

This Jordanian finding may be a typical piece of Arab exaggeration. But it also coincides with findings of Israeli intelligence — namely, that sections of the Egyptian high command, and just below, now believe Egypt should move closer to the United States—since only the United States can pressure Israel into a political settlement.

#### Messages Flying

It is certainly true that Calro and Washington today are engaged in a more genuine dialogue than at any time since the 1967 war. Messages are flying between Secretary of State William P. Rogers and President Nixon and Foreign Minister Mahmoud Minister Mahmoud Minister Mahmoud Minister Mini

official anger over American failure to gain full Israeli compliance with total withdrawal.

sure of how much importance Cairo gives to the dialogue with Washington.

Furthermore, diplomats in Cairo continually warn against exaggerating Soviet penetration of Egypt. For instance, they, as well as Egyptian yachtsmen to whom this reporter talked, say that the much-ballyhooed naval base the Russians are supposed to be building at the isolated fishing port of Matruh on the Western Egyptian Mediterranean coast is more an Israeli intelligence and CIA creation than a reality.

It is true that Russian vessels do use the harber. It is possible that installations could be built at Matruh. But eye-witness accounts say the harber is still open to civilian Egyptian traffic, that no water or oil pipelines have been started across the desert, and that no heavy Soviet warships are present.

One diplomat in Cairo said Matruh is used for small Soviet "electronic trawlers", and for rest and swimming of

Deeper questions of Soviet inroads in Egypt go to the heart of civilian life. The visitor to Cairo is continually struck by the "Western" face of the city—from its Englishlanguage road, signs to its preference for American movies and German automobiles.

#### Russians Not Apparent

Russians — officials or tourists — are not visible. Great resentment has been caused by their turning apartment houses and villas in fashionable Zamalek on Gazira island into virtual billets.

But Egyptian officials, many of them talented and Western-educated, warn against underestimating the real Soviet impact. It extends far beyond the military—even beyond Egypt's mortgaging most of its cotton crop for Soviet aid, or Soviet agreement to complete an obviously unprofitable steel mill outside Cairo.

Cairo.
"The Soviet experts know how to work within our inefficient system," said a Harvard-trained geologist, who works with them day in and day out.

#### Russians Have Knack'

The Russians keep to themselves, he said, they must communicate through an interpreter in English. But they

© ARDESC-016045000800240001-0 to get along with on the job because they will accept the decision of the Egyptian

"boss" — no matter how wrong it may be. And their "modest way of life." appeals to their underpaid Egyptian counterparts.

"I begin to think that you Americans — and the Europeans — so rich and well-fed, cannot really deal with the developing world," he continued. "The Russians have the knack

- at least here."

This man, well-established and comfortable in his beautiful suburban villa, did not claim to relish his conclusion. Soviet ideology is 180 degrees from his. He had no illusions—the Russians were obviously prospecting in the desert of Egypt to locate resources of copper, nickel, even uranium, which they could use one day.

But he does accept — even admire — the practical unobtrusive Soviet approach to Egypt. In the long run, this approach may bear more fruit than the troublesome military role which is the obvious current lever for Soviet influence in this leader of the Arab world.

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31 JANUARY 1971

## The Middle East in Revolution

By Humphrey Trevelyan. 275 pp. Boston: Gambit. \$5.95.

#### By MILES COPELAND

The trick of understanding Arab politics is to remember that most Arab leaders rose to power by making promises they knew they couldn't keep, and committing themselves to goals they knew to be unobtainable. Once in power, their ability to stay there must to a large extent depend on their skill at blaming others for their failure to deliver.

Economies of the Arab countries remain backward because "the imperialists want to keep us poor, and are holding us back" (Iraq's President al-Bakr). Censorship, police controls and extraordinary disciplines on the populations are justified by "the constant threat of Israeli aggression" and "ever alert foreign agents in our midst" (Egypt's President Sadat). Difficulties between King Hussein and the Palestinian guerrillas are the result of "intrigues of the American Central Intelligence Agency" (Libya's President el-Qaddafi). "Arab unity" remains a myth not because nationals of any one "Arab" country loathe those of all the others, but because of "Zionist and imperialist schemes to keep us divided" (the late President Nasser).

This is by way of saying that in the Arab world the problems that get the most airing are either insoluble or not the real problems at all. Diplomacy of the great powers has become largely a matter of pretending to be working at one problem (e.g., getting the Arabs and the Israelis to agree to a lasting peace) while actually concentrating on another (e.g., facing the fact that the Arabs and the Israelis are not going to agree and minimizing the consequences of this unhappy fact). Since the Arab world is not unique in its offering of non-problems and insoluble problems, the foreign offices of the Great Powers find themselves increasingly concerned with minimizing losses rather than making gains, and depending more and more on trouble-shooting diplomats who are particularly qualified for such an approach. Robert Murphy, Averell

Mr. Copeland, formerly consultant to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' on Middle Pater of a firm of Release 2001/03/04 bCIA RDR 80-0160 R000800240601 hours now a senior patter of a firm of international government relations specialists and the author of "The

Harriman and Cyrus Vance are examples of American diplomats who have specialized in undertaking impossible tasks.

Britain's outstanding success at non-successful diplomacy has been Lord Trevelyan who, as an admirer in the Foreign Office put it, "has never been assigned an attainable objective." He has, of course. In India, where he began his diplomatic career in 1932 and served until 1947, he was conspicuously successful in removing petty Indian rulers from power and establishing effective state units to take their place-and, as he wound up his service there, in designing an organizational structure for the Indian diplomatic service which remains even today a model for other Asiatic services. During his service in China (1953-55), a superior in London remarked that "Trevelyan gets as much done in those impossible circumstances as our other diplomats manage in European coun-

Among his achievements, he induced the Chinese to accept liability and pay compensation for various items of British and American property they had destroyed, something they had never done before and are not likely to do again, and to release all British prisoners in their hands. (The last prisoner was released on orders of Chou En-lai himself at the time of Trevelyan's departure "as a sort of going away present.") And while he was Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., his last posting before retirement in 1965, Trevelyan built and maintained relations with the Soviets which were as commercially profitable for Britain as those with many Western European countries, but which didn't allow the Soviets the political advantages they sought.

But it was Trevelyan's three assignments in the Arab world-Egypt, Iraq and Aden (the last after being recalled from retirement) - which gained for him his reputation as Britain's leading practitioner of "diplomacy as a kind of art of the as Foreign Minister impossible," George Brown put it. Trevelyan was assigned to Egypt in 1955 as the last British troops were leaving Egypt, and while his superiors in London

as such. Independently of the British Embassy in Cairo-and, indeed, withwas conducting various operations to undermine Nasser's influence in the Sudan, to discredit him elsewhere in the Arab world, and, finally, to remove him by military conquest -the Anglo-French-Israeli attack of October, 1965.

It was Trevelyan's task, equipped with what little information Whitehall saw fit to send him besides what he could read on news ticker tapes, to "save some semblance of British influence," as one of his superiors in London put it, and "to ensure that the ruptures which would inevitably occur along the way were not irreparable." His account of how he accomplished this makes engrossing reading for any American Ambassador who has had the experience of working innocently at one line of approach while a certain agency, without his knowledge, is working at another.

Lord Trevelyan was assigned to Iraq in 1958, just after the murder of the pro-British royal family and Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa'id. His mission in this instance was to make friends with the "revolutionary" Government, whose leaders were not only anti-British but partially insane, and see that it didn't turn to the U.S.S.R. Here the problem was not so much to cope with intrigues directed from London, independently of his Embassy, as to convince the Iragis that no such intrigues existed.

At the same time, he had to keep track of Iraq's intrigues against British interests in the Persian Gulffor example, a scheme of President. Kassem's to seize Kuwait, and its \$1,000,000-a-day revenue, simply by announcing that it was thenceforth a district of Iraq, with the ruler of Kuwait as its governor, and sending in troops "to protect Iraqi citizens from imperialist persecution." This move was prevented by the landing of British troops in Kuwait in what was certainly the least dramatic and least publicized important military move in modern Middle Eastern history.

The Iraqi Government, instead of burning the British Embassy and calling for support of other Arab states in a widespread denunciation of yet another example of British imperialism, complained mildly and let the matter drop. Once again Trevelyan had shown his diplomatic cousins how to de-dramatize a crisis. When he finished his assignment and was about to leave Baghdad, President Kassem gave him a farewell dinner.

become clear that the British had no choice but

STATINTL

## Letters To The Editor

#### Arab Teaching of Hebrew

In the story you published on Dec. 13 over the signature of Jesse W. Lewis, the writer notices such "dramatic shifts" in the Arab world since 1967 as an "attempt to teach Hebrew at an Arab university." Such an attempt, the writer believes, "would have been branded (prior to 1967) a Zionist-CIA plot."

The Department of Arabic and Oriental Studies in Cairo University has been teaching Hebrew long before the 1947 partition of Palestine. Throughout the last two decades many distinguished scholars pursued different studies and obtained all kinds of degrees in Hebrew and related studies. The author of your article can certainly acquire any catalogue—old or new—of the Cairo University as well as of the newer Universities of Alexandria, Ein Shams, etc., and ascertain this fact.

It was in this department that a Jewish scholar by the name of Wolfinson, who used to call himself in Arabic "Abu Zhuayb," wrote an excellent dissertation in Arabic on Mussa Ibn Maymoun (known in the West as Maimonides). The thesis was written under the guidance of the most eminent Egyptian scholar, Dr. Taha Hussein, and was later published in Cairo in book form with an introduction by another eminent scholar, Mustafa Abdul Razik, at that time the Sheikh of Al-Azhar, the highest Islamic religious post in Egypt. This book should be found in any public library in Egypt—certainly in the library of Cairo University.

In the happy, normal years before the Zionists succeeded in establishing a state in Palestine in 1948, no one was astonished or shocked by the fact that in Cairo University a Jewish scholar had a Muslim tutor on a subject pertaining to Jewish theology. Nor was it a cause for surprise that Cairo University granted Dr. Wolfinson his doctor's degree and appointed him a member of the Faculty of Arts, or that his book, written under the guidance of the most eminent Arab writer, was introduced to the readers by the most eminent Muslim religious leader.

MOHAMED H. EL-ZAYYAT,

Permanent Representative of the UAR at the U.N.

United Nations, N.Y.

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH DESERT NEWS E - 84,85,000.25 1970



By KATHY WILHELMSEN, Descret News Staff Writer

America is caught in a "tremendous quandary" in trying to be more balanced in her treatment of the Middle East because "we can't pay the Arab price nor can we let Israel, our friend, down."

This assessment of the Middle East crisis came Tuesday night at the University of Utah from Miles Copeland, a former State Department official who helped organize the Central Intelligence Agency.

Copeland, author of the pestseller, "The Game of Nations," knew Gamal Abdel Nasser during the late Egyptian lead4r's rise to power in the Arab world.

Copeland told the student audience that "the Israelis have pushed too far in the past year," and used as an example the fact that Israelis

have been flying their airplanes over Cairo.

planes over Cairo.

"Suppose the Cuban army flew anywhere they wanted to over the United Statese," he said. "Well, this similar situation was intolerable to Egypt, and under this argument, Russia began to pour in aid to Egypt."

Copeland said Russia's outlook on the Middle East is much larger than Egypt. The Soviet Union has its eye on squeezing Europe's need for the Middle East's oil by "subtle economic warfare," he said.

The history of the Arab world is one coup d'etat after another, he said. "If you want to understand Arab politics, you must know one fact: without any exception, every Arab leader got into office by making promises he couldn't fulfill, and so he had to keep ou blaming offices for not meeting these promises."

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## Russian-Connected Deaths

Behind the scenes, as indicated by information leaked to American newsmen and commentators who were in Europe or the Middle East, some authorities and others are looking at the unexpected death of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt with the same curiosity with which they regarded the strange death of Joseph Stalin, Russian dictator, who died while Soviet members high in the Communist Party were engaged in a struggle for power.

It has also been noted that two other persons both United Nations officials and closely connected with Russian politics and strategy, one of them known to have incurred Soviet enmity and the other to have been in some conflict with Russia, met death instantly or almost instantly.

It will be recalled that Nasser appeared to be in excellent health the day before he died and that his death seemed to be totally unexpected, although, after his death, he was said to have been fatigued from the diplomatic grind, which acutely involved Israel and Russia.

Before Nasser's death, as pointed out by a commentator who was overseas at the time, Russia had clearly demonstrated its preference for Anwar Sadat, the new President of Egypt. Sadat was described as the Soviet Union's dedicated stooge.

Reports stated that two of Nasser's trusted lieutenants were ruled out as undesirable in talks between the Egyptian chiefs and Russia and that Sadat was requested by Russia as a substitute for one of them.

Those rejected by Russia as conferees included long - time Nasser confidants Sharawi Guma, Nasser's Interior Minister and chief of his secret police intimately In 1956 1057 Hammar kijold was deeply involved in the Suez Canal

known to the Cairo agents of the United States CIA, and Minister of State Amin Huwaydi.

In the Moscow conference attended by Nasser, Sadat and two oth. at Sochi in Russia. ers, the other delegates were brush-Russians insisted that Sadat be pendence in 1960 and Hammarwith Nasser. This was said to have troops to reunite, by force if necesirritated Nasser intensely and his sary, the warring factions. The acirritation was further compounded tion was denounced by Russia. with unauthorized Soviet talks with which demanded that Hammarsk-

in a power struggle inside Russia 18, 1961, just one day before the itself and, as far as we know, did scheduled opening of the 16th seserate Russia's campaign of aggres- al Assembly. sion and its desire to control the whole world.

On the other hand, ser's death, if likewise brought tary - General more to its liking. about by other than natural causful attempt to set up a puppet government in Egypt.

While there never appeared to be any way of gaining proof, history records the quick and untimely deaths of two other men of prominence outside Russia whose deaths occurred unexpectedly and while they were in apparent good health.

The first of these was Dag Hammarskijold, Swedish statesman and economist, who become Secretary General of the United Nations in April 1953 and was unanimously re - elected for another term of five years in September 1957.

Hammarskjold showed no preference for the communists, as some of his successors have done, particularly the present Secretary - General U Thant.

crisis. Thereafter the Middle East

continued to occupy his attention and he went several times to confer with Israeli and Arab leaders. On March 27, 1959, he visited Premier Nikita Khrushchev

Civil war broke out in the Beled off, Taylor stated, while the gion Congo after it gained indepresent at the confidential talks skjold dispatched United Nations jold resign. He refused to do so Stalin's death, if "precipitated," and was killed in a plane crash in as some suspected, was one step Northern Rhodesia, on September little either to deter or accel- sion of the United Nations Gener-

> Hammarskjold was awarded the 1961 Nobel peace prize but Russia Nas- secured a United Nations Secre-

Adlai Ewing Stevenson II, grandes, was a direct meddling in the son of Adlai Ewing Stevenson, who affairs of another nation and was Vice - President of the Unitwas what appears to be a success- ed States, and himself a former governor of Illinois and twice a Democratic candidate for Presi-5 dent of the United States, was another who met a quick and unexpected death after dealings with Russia.

> On December 12, 1960, Presidentelect John F. Kennedy named Stevenson a delegate to the United Nations, with the rank of ambassador. In the United Nations, Stevenson played an important role in the Cuban missile crisis and the Panama crisis and in dealing with the Congo and Cyprus problems. In 1965 he was concerned with the Dominican uprising and the war in Vietnam. His early United Nations actions coincided to some extent with those of Hammarskiold. He had had discussions with the Soviet Union on the disputes be-|80 €01 6101 R:000800240,001<sub>11</sub>0

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Stevenson dropped dead in London on July 14, 1965, a few minutes after he walked out of a press conference. Stories on his completely unexpected death were carried under banner headlines in the Monroe newspapers at that time. When Stevenson fell, efforts were made to revive him. When taken to a hospital by ambulance, he was pronounced dead on arrival. At that time, Stevenson was accompanied by the United States delegate to the United Nations Trusteeship Council.

These four cases, indeed, mark a strange series of coincidences, if they are coincidences.

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PHILADFLPHIA, PA. BULLETIN

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### Some mixed-up CIA intrigue

## none Nasser rhetoric!

By JOHN P. ROCHE

Waltham, Mass. - The other night I had a dream. Naturally, as my faithful readers would anticipate, it was a political dream.

I was reading page one of the New York Times for September 28, 1938 ... an eightcolumn, 72-point headline announced "Adolf Hitler Dies of Heart Attack; Germans Mourn Leader" ... and then the bank: "High U.S. Officials Fear Instability; Death Seen as Blow to Peace Hopes."

I am still enough of a superstitious peasant not to rejoice openly at anyone's death, and it would be absord to equate

the late Gamal Abdel Nasser with the Nazi dictator.

But I would like to say a few words on behalf of instability in the opposition camp.

Unless my instincts have completely misled me, it is going to take quite a while to . sort out the Egyptian mess.

#### CIA Invention

And for once the baby is not on our doorstep: the Soviet Union is in loco parentis.

Ironically the Central In-telligence Agency invented Nasser. (The intriguing outline of the story can be found in Miles Copeland's "The Game of Nations," published last year by Simon & Schuster). Now the Russians have to find a successor and the least we can do is wish them the same sort of luck we had.

They are experts at naked intervention: Nagy shot in Budapest, Kadar installed; Dubcek ousted in Prague, replaced by Husak. In the Middle East, however, they are up against many of the problems we have encountered in Southeast Asia.

Lacking control of the local players, they are prime targets for Arab shakedown art-ists.

Nasser, in my reading, was an extremely talented scoundrei rather than an ideological : Messiah.

of his CIA mentors, notes, Nasser didn't know he was an-"Arab" until our theoreticians explained it to him. (The E3yptians had traditional contempt for Arabs until Nasser suddenly surfaced as the prophet of pan-Arabism).

#### 'Real cozy'

When he wanted a theory of government, the CIA obliged with a pamphlet entitled "Power Problems of a Revolutionary Government," which

ser's deputies, Zakaria Mo-hieddin.

· It was real cozy.

However, the CIA, even in its most flamboyant period back in the 1950s could not supply Nasser with position papers on destroying Israel. and he got tired of being told to be "responsible" and concentrate on Egypt's domestic problems.

So he decided to take his business to Moscow, where he fitted neatly into long-range Soviet plans for moving into the Mediterranean.

Meanwhile, as a footnote to all the current statements by: world leaders about his "great devotion to his people," etc., the Egyptian standard of living was declining absolutely; that is, each year the per capita income decreased.

#### A surprise

The Soviets made the shrewd assessment that this time Nasser would stay bought - not because they had sublime faith in his character, but because their interests and his happened to coin-l cide in a way the United States could never match.

We could never abandon Israel no matter how much we wanted "stability" in the Arab, world.

This apparently puzzled Soviet Premier Alexi Kosygin. At Glassboro, in 1967, when he and President Johnson disRussian expressed his clinical surprise that we would back two and a half million Israelis against a hundred million Arabs.

He asked, in effect, "what's in it for you?"

The President said, "We think it's right" - a line Secretary Rogers might periment with.

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## Took the CIA Money

By GEORGE WELLER

The death of President Nasser ends the greatest personal duel in modern espionage: the gentlemanly struggle between him and the CIA,

Russians. But the monument by which crudely if sent through the State Dept. the American agency will be remembered in Nasser's age is the soaring Copeland, the CIA man trained in the replacement named Bruce a \$3 million joke.

When Nasser came to power in 1952, the CIA had a notion that they had to pay him to keep his friendship and \$3 million seemed about right as an opener.

When \$2,999,990 in \$10 bills was delevered to him-a quick-fingered Lebanese middleman took the extra \$10-Nasser wondered whether to toss it only complicated stupid moves. In that back at them scornfully.

But knowing how stingy the intelligence services of other powers are, Nasser decided to find out more about the lavish Americans.

Instead of salting the American bribe away in Switzerland in the customary fashion of African and Latin statesmen, he built a deliberately unfunctional tower. Even today, beside the Nile, it looks like a missile that aborted and never left the ground. But the tower sometimes does groan out warnings of the rooftop-level, windowsmashing raids of Israeli planes.

Since the covers of the CIA men were transparent, Nasser was early confronted with the same problem as the Israelis: How to make friends with the spies, without seeming to compromise their disguise.

Why did he not simply throw out the spies?

## Laughed

Because he, like the Israelis, valued Nasser's most massive monument is them as a second pipeline through the great dam and lake at Aswan which to send Washington his own named after him, and built by the views, which might be screened too

Gently he drew tall, amiable Miles Syria's intrigue, into his confidence.

Nasser, a man of lively humor, had as much fun trying to unravel American purposes as Western historians have in making up involuted reasons for Arab behavior.

Nasser once told Copeland: "The genius of you Americans is that you never make clean-cut stupid moves, way, you make us work at the possibility that there may be something to them we are missing."

The frolic of Nasser and his confi-

dant spy came to a gradual decline when Copeland went into private business in Beirut. Still, Nasser liked him and kept up the personal contact.


Then the agency sent out T. Odell, a steady man but without the panache of Copeland. He lasted just long enough for the Egyptian police to rig a charge against a newspaper publisher, Stafa Amin, long Nasser's personal instrument for planting stories.

Copeland has written a brilliant book, "The Game of Nations," on his years with Nasser. Nasser himself, no man to knock down candor when it was amusing, approved it.

Nasser had carefully studied how to swing American attention occasionally away from the Israelis to the Arabs. He practiced it, Copeland recalls, in addressing John F. Kennedy in a letter "from the oldest and poorest country of the world to the President of the youngest and richest country of the world."

But the moralizing tone of Kennedy foreign policy bored and annoyed him as much as had the sermons of John Foster Dulles.

"So long as you delude"
yourselves with so much moral rationalizing," Nasser told his favorite agent, "I am, just as uneasy when you are with me as when you are against me. If only you would just play the game."-CDN



NASSER'S JOKE ON CIA: The 600-foot high Tower of Cairo, built by the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser with money given to him by the American Central Intelligence Agency. (UPI Photo)

### Useless Tower Built By Nasser

Gamal Abdel Nasser's most massive monument is the great dam and lake at Aswan, named the rooftop-level, windowafter him and built by the Russians. But the monument by which the United States Central Intelligence Agency will be remembered in Nasser's age is the soaring Tower of Cairo, a \$3,000,000 joke.

When Nasser came to power in 1952, the CIA had a notion that it had to pay him to keep his friendship. For openers, the agency thought \$3,000,000 seemed about right.

When \$2,999,990 in \$10 bills was delivered to him - a quick-fingered Lebanese middleman took the extra \$10 -Nasser hesitated whether to toss it back at them scornfully.

But knowing how stingy the intelligence services of other powers are, Nasser decided to find out more about the lavish Americans.

Instead of salting the American bribe away in Switzerland in the customary fashion of African and Latin statesmen, he built a deliberately unfunctional tower.

Even today, beside the Nile,

Chicago Daily News-Post-Dispatch it looks like a missile that CAIRO, Sept. 30 - President aborted and never left the ground. But the tower on occasion has sounded warnings of

#### Approved For Release 2001/03/04 CIA-RDP80-016 5 AUGUST 1970



Miles Copeland, respected State Department Arab expert, CIA agent, President Nasser's confident and psycho-U.S.-Egyptian relations which is bound to infuriate everybody.

and Schuster) is a cynical book which hold protection and alarm system, and reveals that diplomats and Copeland- a lot of effective though unspectacular type "crypto-diplomats" pursue rival riot-control equipment. versions of U.S. policy, that the State When one of Nasser's top aides heard Department and CIA went to great that they were not getting the \$200 lengths to bolster Nasser—in whom million, but only \$20 million, he told that while the State Department main- be begging us to accept the \$200,000,tains an official stance of non-interfer- 000. ence in the internal affairs of other gov-

crypto-diplomats picked Za'im as the from the Nile Hilton. next leader, developed a friendship with Neutralism Pays him, suggested a coup, advised him how to go about it, guided him through its intricacies and were on the spot to tell him what to do once he was in power. Za'im, the prototype of Arab plotters, Copeland tells us, held power "the way the leader of a criminal gang held pow-

#### U.S. Invents Nasser

intimate U.S. relations with Nasser more Nasser interfered in Africa and Copeland says that the State Depart-him ment invented Nasser before he existed: him. Various advisory groups recommended that the United States locate and build nism.

Iraqi holy man" was actually sent on we think of a better way."

a tour of the Arab world. "The project Copeland is a sympathetic friend of did no harm," Copeland observes—"the Nasser, and says that he saw Nasser lessons were put to good use years more often over the years than any Billy Graham."

not assist in the coup itself. Once he was in power, however, the United States was eager to help Nasser consolidate his position. Top U.S. experts were dispatched to advise Nasser Consolidate his patched to advise Nasser Consolidate his patc patched to advise Nasser on how to Just Small Fry Nazis

Reflections of a went on for years over the kind of mili-tary aid which would serve him best.

### Crypto-Diplomat From Rags to Riches

Nasser hoped for \$200 million in economic and military aid, explaining that he wanted to make his "shabby Army" President Nasser's confident and psycho-analyst, and sometimes management consultant, has written an exposé on LIS Favetian relations which is bound government send Nasser "an armorplated Cadillac, a Secret Service man to Copeland's Game of Nations (Simon help organize his bodyguard, a house-

they saw the wave of the future—and Copeland that "before very long you'll

Nasser also received \$3 million in ernments, semi-official agents, like Cope- cash, from the President's unvouchered land, engaged in such exercises as engi-funds. He first thought of returning itneering Husni Za'im's coup in Syria in the amount seemed too small—but then he mockingly blew it all on a non-According to Copeland, American functional tower that tourists could see

Copeland notes that although Secretary Dulles thought neutralism immoral, "we have been conspicuously more wooed by neutralism than by friendship." Copeland says that Nasser re-ceived more U.S. aid than colleagues

Copeland argues that any military aid to Israel only helps the Russians to win er and be lost it for the same reason."

like Nkrumah and Sukarno and other "positive neutrality aspirants" because the principal fear of the Executive he was "difficult but approachable."

U.S. Invents Nasser Far more embarrassing than the brief lion in U.S. aid in the ten years follow-Za'im episode is Copeland's account of ing the Lebanese crisis of 1958. The politics to do for Israel."

Copeland ruefully observes that the United States had high hopes for Nasup a strong charismatic personality who ser and that Nasser's objective of Bonawould lead the Arab world into democracy and mobilize it against communications would transform by the state of Bona-partism was not clear to American Nasser-watchers who thought that he would transform his military dictatorship into a parliamentary democracy. Before Nasser came along, "a Mos-Copeland concedes that Nasser's way of lem Billy Graham" was suggested, and, doing things was not challenged "be-according to Copeland, "a wild-eyed cause at no point along the line could

later" when King Faisal's advisers sug-other Westerner. But, he writes, it hapgested that he pose as the "Moslem pens to Nasser-type leaders, including Nasser, that "whatever the endurance The CIA spotted Nasser planning a of his personality under the assault of coup but, as far as Copeland tells us, loyalty and ordinary fear, the barriers sions with Nasser's Free Officers and did between him and the outside world have not assist in the coup itself. Once he was grown so thick that all but the inference of his personality under the endurance of his personality under the assault of sycophamory, blind adulation, uncritical loyalty and ordinary fear, the barriers between him and the outside world have not assist in the coup itself. Once he was

organize his public relations, information and particular Release 2001/03/04/4/4/2018 PSP 80-07601R000800240001-0 curity, policy, etc.—and negotiations procure ex-Nazi military and propagan-

da experts for Nasser. Copeland defends the Nazis as "small fry"—with a few exceptions—and calls them "survivalists" rather than "unrepentant Nazis." He cites the case of Gen. Wilhelm Farmbacher who, despité his lack of success in overhauling Egypt's army, "gained kudos from Nasser" for the United States for "producing him."

#### By Love Possessed?

Copeland's account of the persistent American courtship of Nasser must anger those Lebanese, Jordanians, Tunisians and other Arabs who rely on U.S. friendship. It must occur to them that Washington has consistently undercut their attempts to withstand Nasser's pressure and made it impossible to defeat Nasser's aggressive interventionism.

Israel has another reason to be disturbed. Copeland's book demonstrates how little concerned U.S. diplomacy and crypto-diplomacy have been to bring about Arab-Israel peace. Instead, U.S. policy aimed at stability through Nas-ser. "We laid a path down before Nas-ser, and he took it," Copeland sums it up. "Things might have been otherwise had he been programmed differently."

The last word from Copeland is that the United States must not send Phantoms to Israel because that is exactly what the Russians want. In a letter to the Paris Herald Tribune on June 13, Copeland argues that any military aid Nasser was given more than \$500 mil-doing in Egypt but what our own GovOAKLAND, CAL. TRIBUNE

E - 225,038 S - 251,534Aug 2 1970.

## Author Says Soviets Want Mideast Tension, Not War

By RAYMOND LAWRENCE Foreign News Analyst

The Soviet Union does not want a war in the Middle East.

It is getting along very well without a direct armed intervention.

A war would compound Moscow's problems, and, also, if there were a war the Israelis' would win, despite massive Soviet aid to Egypt.

These opinions were voiced in an interview here by Miles Copeland, a personal friend for 17 years of Egyptian President Nasser.

Copeland, who has had long experience in the Middle East, helped organize the CIA and formerly was in the State Department. He has just produced a fascinating new book on the area, "The Game of Nations," which exposes some of the complexities of international diplomacy as it relates to this turbulent area.

After retiring from official diplomacy, and crypto-diplomacy as he calls it, Copeland served as an unofficial ficials and Nasser on numer- needs constant hostility with ous occasions; and in his book presents an uninhibited account of behind-the-scenes exchanges relating to some of the most important Middle East problems.

Despite the daily fighting

with Arabs and guerrillas on four fronts, Israel has nothing to fear from an Egyptian attack and they know it, Copeland declared in an interview.

"The Arabs work so hard at losing," he said, "the Israelis have nothing to worry about."

The Egyptians, he pointed out, have lost twice before and "would be beaten a third time if only for one reason-morale." But Copeland also emphasized the superior discipline and technical ability and training of the Israelis, especially the pilots.

Copeland has an interpretation of Nasser quite different from the popular American conception. It is one of the main contributions of his book and is formulated thus:

Nasser's objective is not to destroy Israel (as the militant Arab Palestinians proclaim). Why should he?

His main aim is to stay in power and to increase his strength in such a way that he has more leverage in dealing with the two super powers, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. He

Israel but he doesn't want all-out war because he has been so humiliated in the past.

Copeland believes that "the Soviet Union wants the United States to help Israel because the more we do the angrier it makes the Arabs and the more it polarizes the situa-

Thus, he said, "the main; player in the game of nations wanting us to supply Israel with arms including new jets, is the U.S.S.R."

In line with Moscow's objective of polarizing the situation, it is recognized that the more the United States moves toward support of Israe! the more the Russians can move toward complete domination of the Arabs.

Copeland believes that the inside reasoning behind Secretary of State William Rogers' peace initiative in the Middle East, which has just been accepted by Israel, Egypt and Jordan but not the other Arab states to which it was not presented, was deference to oil

interests and the European continent's need for Middle Eastern petroleum, a primary source.

On the basis of his private diplomatic contacts, Copeland disclosed that certain European continental governments, concerned about their sources of oil, notified the United States to stop the trend toward polarizion in the Middle East, using these very words.

Copeland, after a visit to Washington, described the State Department attitude toward the Middle East as a

plague on both your houses.

He said that no one in the capital suggests or even hints, we should stop supporting Is-

Secretary Rogers, according, to Copeland, thinks we have to find ways of backing Israel on ! our own terms without com-pletely alienating the Arabs.

One State Department official told Copeland we should make our policy rather than? letting Israel do it for us and that the ex-diplomat pointed

"The purely American interests are in not letting the: Soviets dominate Arab oil."

#### Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — Extensions of Remarks

11. The abuse of the mails: Do you approve or disapprove of my bill making it a federal offense to send obscene or pornographic materials through the mail to individual under 16 years of age?

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ 93. 82 Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ 3.34 Undecided \_\_\_\_\_

12. The new federalism: Do you approve or disapprove of the President's proposal for a federal-state partnership with the federal government sharing its revenues with states and localities?

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ 66.88 Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ 12.94 Undecided \_\_\_\_\_ 20. 18

THE DECADE OF THE 1970'S

Please give a numerical rating to these domestic problems indicating the order of priority you feel they should have during the next ten years.

Race relations ... Environmental pollution\_\_\_\_\_\_
Improved quality of education\_\_\_\_\_ Population explosion Mass housing\_\_\_\_\_ Adequate food supply\_\_\_\_\_ Decay of the cities\_\_\_\_\_ Mass transportation\_\_\_\_\_ Control of violence Other

#### CON SON PRISON

SPEECH OF

#### HON. JOHN E. MOSS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 21, 1970 Mr. MOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am happy

to inform the House of Representatives that an important news development has been reported from Saigon—important because it reflects another step forward to a more humanitarian world. The Saigon government has anounced that the notorious "tiger cages" at Con Son prison will be demolished—erased from the face of the earth.

I hope the South Vietnamese Government will now move quickly to wipe out the last vestiges of brutality and neglect which have typified many of its other prisons and interrogation centers.

At the same time, we should call upon any Americans in Vietnam who have had a role in this disgraceful picturewhether it be directly or by turning their backs-to cleanse themselves also.

Only then, can we demand with a clear conscience that the North Vietnamese halt the inhumane treatment of American and South Vietnamese prisoners of war.

The International Red Cross should now be given open and full access to all prisons and detention centers in Vietnam-both North and South-to determine whether necessary reforms have heen taken. They should be allowed to interview any and all prisoners they wish. Their reports should be made public so the full weight of world public opinion may be brought to bear on any remaining injustices.

TEXT OF STATEMENT BY I. L. KENEN

#### HON. JAMES G. FULTON

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, July 22, 1970

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure to place in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the excellent statement of I. L. Kenen on the situation in the Near East before the Subcommittee on Near East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Mr. Kenen is the editor of the Near East Report, a biweekly newsletter on American policy in the Near East, and executive vice chairman of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, a national organization which conducts public action to strengthen United States-Israel friend-

Si Kenen has held a responsible position in the American Jewish community over the years. Between 1943 and 1947, he was secretary of the American Jewish Conference. In 1947, when the United Nations took up the Palestine question, he was director of information for the Jewish agency's delegation, and between 1948 and 1950, he served in the same post in the first Israeli U.N. delegation.

Si Kenen has been a newspaperman both in Toronto, Canada, and Cleveland, Ohio. A founder of the American Newspaper Guild in 1933, he was the recipient of the Guild's Heywood Broun Memorial Award in 1943.

Si Kenen is to be complimented for his fine work for the security of Israel and the Israeli people and for his dedication to peace.

The statement follows:

TEXT OF STATEMENT BY I. L. KENEN

In the Near East today we are witnessing a grim spectacle.

Twenty-five years have passed since World War II revealed the destruction of some six million Jews, the degradation of the survivors of that holocaust and the desolation of the Jewish people around the world. At that time, the civilized international community reacted vigorously and, like the League of Nations after World War I, the United Nations reaffirmed the right of the Jewish people to establish its homeland in Palestine, with which it has been linked for thousands of years of recorded history.

But today that homeland is in danger and there is an incredible indifference to its fate.

Today the tiny nation of Israel, with her three million people, is defending herself from the attacks of the Arab states and the Arab terrorists who have waged war against her since her establishment in 1948.

Israel is caught up in the crossfire of three wars: the war between the Arab states and herself; the Arab-Arab conflict between the radical Soviet-supported states and the conservative Western-oriented states; the cold war between East and West, where she finds herself defending the interests of the Free World but without its active support.

The crucial Arab-Israel issue is the Arab refusal to recognize Israel's right to exist. From the beginning, the Arab states, in violation of the UN Charter and their UN obligations, have persisted in a state of war against a neighbor. In contrast, Israel has steadfastly offered to negotiate peace treaties.

The United Nations has been powerless to

cope with violations and to establish peace.
There is a major reason. The Soviet Union,
on the diplomatic and military fronts, backs the Arab states as part of her strategy to dominate the Near East. Whatever may be her intention-whether it is to destroy Israel or merely to exploit tensions to further her own imperialism—is a matter for speculation. What is alarming is that the Soviet Union can pursue this evil policy without effective challenge from any source.

But while the Soviet Union must bear primary responsibility for the long struggle—so costly in life and resources to both Arabs and Jews-our own Government has some hare in the blame. Over the years, American policy in the Near East has been equivocal, erratic and inconsistent. We have often reversed ourselves. We have been reluctant to STATINTL take a strong position. We have been immobilized by doubts and fears. As a result, the Arab states still like to believe that the United States will ultimately abandon Israel.

What explains the U.S. attitude? First, there is fear that the Arab states may retaliate against America's economic and strategic interests. Second, there is danger that the Soviet Union may gain prestige and power in a polarized Near East. And, third, there are the pressures of special interests concerned with short-term advantage, trying to buy some space and time for themselves by offering up bits and pieces of Israel to appease the Arabs. They like to identify their own interests with those of the United States; they wrap the flag around oil derricks.

These special interests always claim that

the United States favored Israel over the Arab states because of pressures exerted by Israel's friends and that we need a more "evenhanded" policy.

The record refutes the myth.

The fact is that we have been less than even-handed.

In the beginning, in 1947, the United States reluctantly endorsed the UN proposal for the partition of Palestine. But we did nothing to implement that decision. We failed to help Israel to defend her right to the promised state. Instead, we imposed an arms embargo depriving Israel of military assistance from this country. Then, responding to pro-Arab lobbying in and outside the Government, we reversed ourselves; we tried to set partition aside and to substitute an unrealistic UN trusteeship plan.

Subsequently, the United States recurrently pressured Israel to abandon territories she had won in the struggle with the Arabs. While we gave generous economic assistance to both Israel and the Arab states—and Congress was primarily responsible for initiating that program—we repeatedly refused Israel's requests for arms, even after the Soviet Union began arming the Arab states. We detoured her to other countries. In lieu of arms, we offered guarantees, but these faded into scraps of paper when the time came to carry them out.

We declined to support Israel's pleas for direct Arab-Israel peace negotiations. We failed to challenge the Arab boycott. We imprudently perpetuated the Arab refugee problem by urging unrealistic repatriation proposals and by failing to insist on resettle-ment. And often, over the years, we seemed to be in competition with the Soviet Union for the favor of the Arab states, and certain charismatic Arab leaders, like President Nasser of Egypt.

THE ATTITUDE OF CONGRESS

Throughout this period Congress has displayed greater realism on these issues:
The restoration of the Jewish national

homeland was supported by Congress in 1922 and again in 1945—and in the post-war debate, a large majority of the Senate and

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22 June 1970

### The Talky American

THE GAME OF NATIONS: The Amorality of Power Politics. By Miles Copeland. Simon & Schuster. 318 pp. \$6.95.

#### DESMOND STEWART

Mr. Stewart has spent most of the last twenty years in the successor states of the Ottoman Empire: Egypt, Iraq and Lebanon. He is the author of a trilogy, The Sequence of Roles, and has just completed a study of the Near East called The Temple of Janus, which Doubleday will publish next year.

Mr. Miles Copeland was for some years the junior member of a CIA team attached to the U.S. Embassy in Cairo. As name-dropper and influence peddler, he steered the resilient bump 'em car through the Middle East. But despite this rich experience, and despite his book's title and subtitle, Copeland's antimemoirs distill no icy theorem of political strategy to set beside Machiavelli's The Prince. Nor do they constitute a factual account of happenings in the Levant. Such key events as the Israeli raid on Gaza in February 1955, which had as its consequences Nasser's involvement with the Soviet Union, receive but sliding mention, while a prestigious dinner party at which the author was present straddles the book, appearing twice with an interval of many pages. Still less are we dealing with "faction," a neologism defined by Copeland as "fact presented in fictional terms," since the names, if not the conversations, are for real.

The Game of Nations is an indiscreet and undocumented reminiscence of a man employed in, or around, the CIA. It functions as a torpedo, fueled by love-hate, sent zigzagging against the Egyptian President; accidentally it harms the CIA, making it appear not so much lethal as silly and talkative (any future statesman inclined to unburden himself to one of its agents will weigh his words as if they were the kind of rocks once used for stoning).

Some of Copeland's revelations are so irresponsible as to endear him to liberals. His account of the one successful CIA intervention in the Arab world (the overthrow of Iran's Mossadegh and the restoration of the Shah) is a mixture of knockabout and naïvoté. Arguing that in early 1949 "we weren't really Machiavellian and that the current idealism was almost as prominent in our covert activity as it was in our overt," Copeland evokes a CIA group—its one "neargenius intellect patination to plot

an idealistic, not necessarily democratic but pro-American coup. Iraq, a flef of Britain, was rejected, not apparently because it was already the most pro-Western state in the region but because "all programmable evidence showed Nuri Pasha's Government to be virtually coupproof." The area chosen for experimentation was Syria, then ruled by a wobbly parliamentary system.

In March 1949, Husni Za'im, a notorious Kurdish general, was assisted by these American idealists in launching what proved to be the first of an alphabet of Syrian coups. In power, he was a disappointment. "Za'im had been so 'amenable to suggestion' (as we said in our reports) before the coup that it never occurred to us that things would change afterwards." But change things did. Za'im insisted on Copeland's jumping to his feet when he came into the room; the friendly "tu" must yield to "vous"; so after four and a half months, Za'im went.

Syria was a mere rehearsal for Egypt, to the CIA, as to Napoleon, The Most Important Country. Initially, the CIA had thought to reorganize Egypt through a palace revolution led by Farouk. This marijuana vision wilted in the gray light of Abdin Palace. Instead, Kermit Roosevelt visited Cairo and established contact with the "Free Officers," in existence for many years but gingered by the fiasco of the first Palestine war. In Gamal Abdel Nasser the CIA recognized, Copeland believes, an ambitious and effective leader who would first establish a power base, the army, loyal to himself, since he would share the fruits of power with it, and then cooperate with such U.S. aims as the settlement of the conflict with Israel. In return for such accommodation, this archetypal leader, unfettered by democratic controls, would be given U.S. support to become a more powerful Arab leader than any in the past.

Copeland assures us—and the assurance must have shored his reputation in Washington as much as familiarity with "Walt" and "Dick" shored it in Cairo—that

Over the years I have probably seen more of Nasser than any other Westerner. Even now, although it is no longer possible to drop in on him informally and stay for lunch, I manage a long talk with him every month or two, and under relaxed circumstances in which he is most likely to be him-

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THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
29 May 1970

# Spies in a honey

## pot

Peter Harvey on the exodus of secret agents

THE NUMBER of Western
military intelligence
agents operating in the
Middle East has been sharply
increased in recent weeks.
British, American, and
French intelligence services
are actively seeking more
accurate and detailed information as tension between
Israel and the Arab States
continues to heighten, and
the Soviet military build-up
in Egypt grows

"We are approaching flashpoint in the Middle East." a Western diplomatic source said yesterday. "It is absolutely essential that all possible information is gathered now. Forecasting events in the Middle East has been, at times, rather spotty and erratic. No interested party can afford not to have 'prime' information coming in from that area today."

The United States has long had the most sophisticated; and extensive network of intelligence agents in Mediterranean and Middle East countries, while Britain and France have relied on a few resident operatives and a losely knit network of sources.

The picture has changed dramatically during the past two months. British military intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency and the US military intelligence, and the French Deuxieme Bureau have all posted senior men (and, in at least two cases, women) to the Middle Eact. The NATO security service has also substantially increased its operations in the area.

Another senior diplomatic source yesterday reported "a great deal of to-ing and fro-ing" between London, Paris, and Washington and the Middle Fast by Western-military internal lates were in recent weeks.

#### Missile sites

It is understood that European intelligence chiefs are pleased with the recent increase in the volume and quality of information now coming in, During the past 48 hours, agents of one European power reported to their headquarters that Egypt has placed another request with Moscow for an increase in military aid. It is believed that a high-level Egyptian mission visited Moscow with the request from Colonel Nasser for more fighter aircraft and pilots, and additional Sam-3 missile sites for defence of the Cairo and Nile delta areas.

That request was made about three days ago. A few days earlier, Egypt had asked Russia for more transport aircraft and mobile radar stations, the intelligence service learned.

In this intelligence expansion Britain also has a special interest in operations in the Gulf States. "The future of Gulf oil is integral to the future of the whole Middle East," a diplomatic source said. "Once the British pull out, at the end of 1971, there is a possibility of serious internal troubles sweeping through the Gulf States governments, but the oil supplies."

western intolligence is operating at all levels in the Middle East, from overt to "the 007 type of things," a diplomatic source said yesterday.

The source described basic operations as a complex, interlocking process of gleaning, listening, looking, and evaluation. Newspapers are read for pointers to further information. The agents seek to establish widespread networks of contacts and sources, the number of military vehicles moving through a certain town at a certain time, the number of times airports are closed for repairs or maintenance work... all this is part of the work now going on." (The closure of an airport for seemingly routine maintenance work has often heralded, in certain Middle East countries recently, the arrival of a consignment of

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## Our Drifting Policy On the Middle East

#### By Stephen S. Rosenfeld

People sense they ought to switch, or at and goes into the Suez zone.

least to broaden, their concern but there So it is that some officials are unsympaseems to be no room or taste for another thetic to Israel's request to the United States

Mideast, apart from attention to the issue of new missile-site preparations near the have gotten badly bogged down in argument Suez Canal.

The writer is a member of the editorial, page staff of The Washington Post.

over Vietnam. Joseph Alsop contends that terior may be freeing and encouraging Cairo war protest weakens the government's capacity to act in the Mideast. Edward Kennedy replies that lingering in Vietnam has to start driving across the Canal—this collides in much Department thinking with understanding for the Arabs' contention of Israel, Israel loses both ways. (The same that a cease-fire without an Israeli with-White House sources, by the 'way, who started out claiming the Cambodian action would be received in Moscow as a warning.

Another consideration is that Source in the consideration is that Source and performance in the consideration in the consideration is that Source and performance in the consideration is that Source and performance in the consideration is that Source in the consideration in the consid would be received in Moscow as a warning cover may be depriving Israel of the first-

The American commitment to Israel is Israeli cities. "much the same as we have toward England," Miles Copeland, ex-CIA hand in Cairo,

policy is drifting without presidential direc-lence were painted for them. tion. which a matter of this scale requires. Policy continues in the direction taken last involvement is still "limited" and that it can March when Israel's request to buy more best be checked by Israeli forces acting alone jets was deferred in the hope of inducing -with adequate military supplies and politilike Soviet restraint. Some American am cal backing from the United States. Mrs. bassadors accredited to Arab governments Meir noted this week that Israel sought cabled back that the no-more-jets-now deci- equipment for defense "and deterrence." sion was statesmanlike; this newspaper She also reiterated Israel's intention to deemed it wise. In fact, it may have con-"stand firm on the cease-fire lines, without tributed to the Soviet Union's own univer budging until the conclusion of a peace sally startling decision to take over the air under which secure and recognized boundadefense of the Egyptian interior with its ries will be determined." This is Israel's

cow to make its move, however, the impel ers here wonder if the United States will ling factor quite surely was Israel's air continue to support Jerusalem in it. strikes around Cairo—a series undertaken. The common assumption in Washington for one stated reason, to humiliate Nasser, is that Mr. Nixon views the Mideast in the "Had we not checked the Egyptians and re- terms of an overarching Soviet-American turned counterblows, the Russians might not contest and that he will respond in that

SIX TIMES President Nixon has made Choice or no, the weight of State Depart making it easier for Arab governments to major statements on the Vietnam war, not ment thinking seems to be that Israel curb their reactions to his decision, and of once on the Middle East. Congress has dis brought the Soviet pilots on itself. Diplo-easing worries among Americans about "ancussed Vietnam up and down but neither mats of this mind see the pilots in terms other Vietnam" in the Mideast. Whether house has held hearings on the Arab-Israeli of a great power's justifiable assumption the sale of planes will stop the Soviet adconflict. The peace movement brings of a limited defensive role for a needy and vance is a question whose answer is unhundreds of thousands into the streets to deserving client. The resulting tendency is known, probably not even in Moscow. It's protest a fading war at the far end of Asia to wait to see whether Moscow pushes out not just policy that is drifting but the situa-and ignores a swelling war at the near end beyond the area it is presently patrolling tion itself.

major alarm. Anyway, once aroused, what to keep the jet pipeline open. Nourishing could you do? Meanwhile, the terms of discussion of the aerial photographs to bolster all its claims

ON MARCH 21 President Nixon listed a cease-fire as his "first" Mideast goal. But that Soviet air cover over the Egyptian in-

applicable to the Mideast, backed off that strike capability it held and used in the 1956 claim when public reaction to Cambodia and 1967 wars. That is, Israel may not be as Under the surface is an implicit threat to Egypt's war-making forces before they get Vietnam war critics: calm down or forget into action. There is also the question of about Israel. The fair reply is: the two are how an Egyptian leadership relieved of condifferent. So they are. The values Americans cern for its cities and other vital targets would regard the question of strikes against

American officials whose main interest is put it in an interview. Few would say that tend to play down these darker military possibilities. So do Israeli officials, who evidently fear that Americans might get scared AT LEAST for the moment, American if too lurid a picture of prospective vio-

The official Israeli view is that the Soviet maximum bargaining position. Now that the If the delay on jets finally released Mos- Russians have come to Egypt, some observ-

have come on the scene," Israel's chief of framework to Israel's requests for more staff, Gen. Bar-Lev, admitted on May 7. He planes. The terms of his response, it is exadded, "But we had no choice."

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## Approved For Release 2001/03/04 POA-RDP80-0

28 MAY 1970

THE GAME OF NATIONS The Amorality of Power Politics

Miles Copeland (Simon and Schuster, 318 pp., \$6.95)

Reviewed by Godfrey Hodgson

The reviewer was Washington correspondent of th London Observer for several years. He is now editor of the London Sunday Times "Insight" reporting team.

## Nations at Play

didn't fit before.

seeps back, wrapped in ques- and the obvious.

from the several current sion, in 1955, when Kermit erous class in thus attached views of it, all of which Roosevelt of the CIA, taking to the revolution. Copeland thinks mistaken— Copeland with him, slipped certain neo-Machiavellian into Cairo ahead of John principles of general appli- Foster Dulies' special emistor reassure American about international cation about international sary, and unknown to the

You have to talk to him, be-knowledge at certain points. as fine them as, but just as cynical, cause he really was in It adds important bricks of tale, and loses nothing in counting and "realistic" as places where you weren't knowledge to an under-copland's telling. The mo-could be desired. He really does tell you standing of Middle Eastern ment when he and Roosethings you don't know, be politics and American policy velt hid in Nasser's apart unreassured. Nothing in this sides, and some of them in Egypt, Syria and Leba ment while the Egyptian book is more disturbing really do explain things that non. The second is a naive president told the British than a premise that Copedn't fit before. essay in political science, ambassador, untruthfully land takes for granted. It is The trouble is that, as he with a tendency to oscillate and on Roosevelt's sugges. that, whether the American buttonholes you, incredulity between the unverifiable tion, in Copeland's version, foreign policy machine unthat the arms were not Rus. derstands a given country or tions. Were all the others. It seems that Copeland got, sian but Czech: this was per-not, whether that country is

archtype of the man with ing the organizational the high point of his book, must play the game and the inside dope. The jacket mess' in the Washington incopy should have been written in a breathy adolescent telligence community after systematically exaggerates ther cleverness nor realism both the wisdom and the appears to be the most saliagent, see, and he became a signment was in Syria, role of his best contact, ent quality of the lightreal close friend of Nasser, where he claims to have Copeland seems to me con hearted cryptodiplomats see, and like he really un-played a part in an Ameri-sistently to overrate both who sallied forth to bring derstood what those guys in. derstood what those guys in played a part in an America of the distribution of the dis bull they hand out, this is where he did become-and mit that Copeland's view of least really the straight stuff, like still remains—a confident of Nasser—as first and fore frankness has added to our I mean he lays it on the President Nasser and of most a pragmatic Egyptian knowledge of those swash-That is unkind, but I many of the men around leader, doing the best he buckling years. think it is fair. Actually, him. Later still, he set up as could—has stood the test of think it is fair. Actually, him. Later still, he set up as time better than most Brit-Copeland has woven two a business consultant to ish and American judgbooks into one. The first is a American business in the shrewd narrative of Middle Middle East, though he still snrewd narrative of Middle East, though he still Eastern politics over the 20 years leading up to the outbreak of the June war of 1967, with American relations with Egypt as the central theme. The second is an attempt to extrapolate from Nasser's policy—his "real" policy, as distinct from the several current "That was the famous occa-"

Middle East, though he still macy with the Nasser circle has given him several interesting insights. One of these is the realization that, for a revolutionary ruler in a developing country, it is actually desirable to have an overswollen a r m y and bureaucracy, not for anyThat was the famous occa
That was the famous occa
That was the famous occa
The second is an attempt to extrapolate and also hilarious moment, he was actually backstage.

That was the famous occa
That was the famous occa-That was the famous occa- fining they will actually

> pose, however, seems to be to reassure Americans that the cryptodiplomats who regular American ambassar have the real running of policy in areas like the Middle

Every reporter knows the The first element is dor to help Nasser draft the, East are not the naive, soft man with the inside dope with exceptional inside nounded that he was accent nouncements would

We should surely remain really such fools as he into the game of what he haps the supreme moment important to the United makes them out? Was it calls "crypto-diplomacy" by in Copeland's life as the States or not, the United really as simple as he's tell- accident: he was working man with the cryptodiplom
States must nevertheless ing me? for a firm of management atic dope. States must nevertheless in-Miles Copeland is the consultants who were "study- That 1955 episode is also tervene there somehow,

Miles

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23 MAY 1970

#### Alex Campbell: CIA on the Nile

#### The Game of Nations by Miles Copeland

(Simon & Schuster; \$6.95)

Beirut has always been full of spies Army's IBM machine erroneously sentative sympathizes with the Revobut in the late fifties and early sixties wrote his birthplace on his classifica- lution," which gave Nasser all he they were very thick on the ground tion card as "Ukr," for the Ukraine really wanted in Lebanon at that time. The British had "Kim" Philby who After World War II Meade performed Ten years after that, Nasser, egged on turned out to be really working for such intelligence chores as rescuing by the Meade-programmed, coupthe Russians. There was also a Pales- captured German scientists from Com- crazy Syrians, involved the Middle tinian who worked for everyone, sell- munist China, and corrupting Kurdish East in a war from which it's still trying his carbons to the Russians, the tribal leaders on the Soviet border, ing vainly to extricate itself. British, the Americans, the Jordanians Then "Kim" Roosevelt chose him for The goings on that Miles Copeland and the Egyptians. And there was Cairo, where he and Copeland worked describes may - or may not - have Miles Copeland, a business consultant on Nasser as a promising replacement been curtailed by President Kennedy's who had worked for the State Departs for the unsatisfactory King Farouk. letter of instruction to US ambassament elsewhere in the Middle East, Soon Nasser was assuring the Ameri- dors in May 1961, inviting them to Roosevelt, and who had joined the get rid of the British and that he re-ficial activity in the countries to which stant access to President Nasser.

then Za'im refused to play. Instead of cial gathering." None of which, of What perspective? showing gratitude by being an obedicourse, did the US the least good in ent zombie, he "brusquely informed Nasser's eyes. The only way to a own Syrian associates were less com- their distribution to the Russians. pliant to his masterful whims. They Copeland quit Cairo and set up his him as a French agent."

had grabbed him for possible para- group. The picture was printed, capchuting into Approved Tuer குண்டு 2001யூ3/04 நடு இ80-01601R000800240001-0

was close to Teddy's grandson "Kim" cans that all he really wanted was to take full control over all American of-CIA. Miles's business took him often garded regaining Palestine as "unim- they were accredited. That looked at, to Cairo, where he seemed to have in- portant." Once in power, Nasser the time like a mandate to ambassa-His book about the Middle East is Russians. The CIA abjectly put up dlers. No more humiliations for decent subtitled "The Amorality of Power with this and, when the American men like Byroade? But the CIA is Politics" and is a sort of "Catch-22" Ambassador in Cairo, Henry Byroade, currently running a little war of its of American diplomacy. Quite a lot of protested to Nasser at a dinner party own in Laos - and the US Ambassa- N people get killed. Husni Za'im of about Nasser's thugs roughing up the dor, McMurtrie Godley, is said to be Syria, for instance. Washington de- US Labor Attaché, Copeland says that top war lord. Copeland concludes his cided to make him top American Byroade was pressured into apologiz- wry and witty account by saying that stooge in the Middle East, by hoisting ing to Nasser in writing (not for the "our diplomats who were so naive . . . him into power in Syria through a first or last time) for having "raised have come a long way and have demilitary coup. This succeeded, but an unpleasant subject at a pleasant so-veloped a whole new perspective."

[Major Stephen] Meade and myself climb-back the CIA could think of that we were henceforth to leap to our feet as he entered the room." Copeland lot of books with titles like Mohamand Meade were ready to humor their mad Never Existed, of pre-World War Frankenstein's monster, but Za'im's One vintage, and attempt to attribute

finally murdered him, buried him in Beirut office in May 1957, and about the French cemetery in Damascus and a year later President Eisenhower sentcoldly told Copeland and Meade, "We Marines to Lebanon to intervene in a are doing you the favor of treating civil war in which Nasser had a hand. Eisenhower also sent Robert Murphy, Copeland is coy about revealing how whose first act according to Copeland he himself became an agent, but says was to be photographed shaking hands Meade became one by accident. G-2 with the leader of Nasser's terrorist

played the Americans off against the dors to restrain CIA and other med-

HE RECURRENT fiascos suffered by Israeli spies in the United Arab Republic, Iraq, Syria and Jordan have once again focussed public attention on the subversive activities of Tel Aviv Intelligence. Or, to be more exact, on the secret service of international Zionism, of which Israeli Intelligence is an integral part.

The State of Israel, which came into existence in 1948, is much younger than its intelligence service. The latter was established back in 1937 under the name of Sherut Israel (Israel Service) by the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, the Zionist organization in charge of Jewish immigration to Palestine.

The Zionist leaders pinned their hopes for the establishment of a "national home" in Palestine exclusively on the imperialist powers, above all Great Britain. The catechism of the Zionist movement-"Der Judenstaat" ("The Jewish State"), written at the end of the 19th century by Theodor Herzl-says: "For Europe, we shall create, there in Palestine, an outpost against Asia, we shall be the vanguard of the civilized world against barbarism." A few decades later Chaim Weizmann, leader of the World Zionist Organization and subsequently Israel's first President, sought to win over the colonial politicians in London by saying that "a Jewish, Palestine would be a protective wall for Britain, especially in the Suez Canal Zone."

High-flown words went hand in hand with nefarious deeds. Sherut Israel engaged in political espionage and fought against the progressive elements of the Jewish and Arab population of Palestine. Isser Galperin, who was in charge of its Investigation Department and collaborated with the British, became head of the Sherut Bethahon counterintelligence service (Shin Beth for short) after the establishment of Israel. Important posts in the British Intelligence Service were held by Shiloah, Kollek, Gabrieli and other former and present bigwigs in the Israeli spy network. Foreign Minister Abba Eban was in-it too, and rose to the rank of major.

## The Zionist Secret Service

ARKADY BUTLITSKY

Israel built its secret service round the nucleus formed by members of the Sherut Israel and three clandestine armed groups which had operated in Palestine-Haganah (Self-Defence), Irgun Zvai Leumi (Military National Organization) and Stern (so called after its organizer). The London Sunday Telegraph wrote at the time that many Israelis were shocked to see authoritative government organs placed under the control of fanatics and extremists from the Stern and the Irgun Zvai Leumi. But the Zionist leaders knew what they were doing. Israel's first Premier, David Ben Gurion, who had hobnobbed with high-ranking officials of the British Intelligence Service, promised them that his secret service would cooperate closely with them in the struggle against the national liberation movement in the Arab East. And for this purpose the Stern and the Irgun Zvai Leumi fanatics were eminently suitable,

#### Unholy Alliance

After the war, British influence in the Middle East declined while the the United States of position grew stronger. But since the national liberation and anti-imperialist struggle waged by the Arab and other peoples was gaining momentum, U.S. imperialism turned to the Zionist leaders for help. In the Washington strategists' plans Israel was assigned the job of guarding imperialist interests in the Middle East. It was then, in the early 1950s, that close contact between the American and Israeli secret services was established.

Israel's present intelligence system is a sort of miniature copy of the American. In the United Stafes, the activities of the secret services are directed by the Intelligence Advisory Committee, whose chairman—he concurrently heads the

Central Intelligence Agency—is directly subordinated to the President. Israel has a similar co-ordinating committee and its chairman is also in charge of the country's main intelligence organization—the Reshut Mosad (Central Intelligence and Security Agency). There are military and diplomatic secret services both in the United States and in Israel. The Israeli counterpart of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is the Shin Beth political police.

The identity of organizational structure makes it easier for the two countries to co-ordinate the activities of their secret services. According to the French magazine Express, Israel's attack on the U.A.R., Syria and Jordan in June 1967. was planned partly on the basis of NATO operational reconnaissance data and even more so on information received directly from the CIA. The assistance of its "senior partners" enabled Tel Aviv Intelligence to supply the Is-1 raeli command with information about; the Arab countries' armed forces, strategic and tactical plans, and the deployment of their air forces.

The CIA naturally is not interested in flaunting its ties with the Israeli secret service. Nevertheless, information on this score does find its way into the press from time to time. The Lebanese newspaper Al Moharrer, for instance, exposed the CIA's complicity in the Israeli commandos' hit-and-run attack on Beirut Airport in December 1968. Americans working at the airport, the paper said, had access to documents relating to the flights of Lebanese and other Arab air liners and passed on information to a CIA agent enjoying diplomatic status. The fact that the Israelis chose to raid the airport at the time when the largest number of Arab air liners were there was evidence, according to Al Moharrer, of help rendered them by their CIA colleagues.

U.S. secret agents, press reports say,

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## Wright's Africa trip may bring '76 Olympics to LA

#### By JACK GALLAGHER

Post Sports Writer

Along a 27,000-mile route Stan Wright recently engaged in a good will mission to Africa that may bring the 1976 Olympic Games to Los Angeles.

On behalf of a California group interested in returning the summer games to the U.S. for the first time in 44 years, the former Texas Southern University coach visited Nigeria, Kenya, Ivory Coast, Tunisia, Morroco and Egypt, influencing delegates to cast a favorable vote for the U.S.

The results will be learned when the International Olympic Committee meets in Am-

sterdam May 12. In a secret ballot, 72 individuals will vote whether to hold the summer games in Los Angeles, Moscow or Montreal.

"I have to believe we did a world of good," said Wright, who returned to his track coaching job at Sacramento, (Calif) State last week after the 17-day trip. "Despite political problems, despite the anti-U.S. sentiment because of our stand on Biafra and Nigeria, the reception was overwhelming."

Wright feels that Moscow will be the principal U.S. competition for the IOC vote. Accompanied by Hilmer Lodge, U.S. delegate to the International Amateur Athletic Federation, Stan also

stopped in Munich. There all 121 Olympic nations were represented at a sports federation meeting, where the U.S. made a convincing presentation.

"We carried with us a letter from President Nixon declaring that delegates were free to travel in the U.S. without restriction," Wright explained. "In other words, tourists could visit Chicago or Houston or anywhere in the states while they were in Los Angeles.

"That will not be allowed in Moscow. Because of Russia's restricted travel areas, which the delegates are aware of, I think we made some valuable points in Munich.

"Nevertheless, we aren't underestimating the Russians."

Although they made a poor presentation, I don't think they sent their first team to Munich." Then, lapsing into the coaching vernacular, Wright added. "I think the Russians will be much tougher at Amsterdam."

The 1968 Olympic Games cost Mexico between \$175 and \$200 million to produce.

It has been estimated that the games can be staged in Los Angeles for \$16 million. Since the sponsors expect to collect \$19 million in ticket sales and \$40 million from TV, a surplus fund will probably result. Los Angeles has ready-made facilities such as the 92,000 - capacity Memorial Coliseum remaining from the 1932 summer games.

have to construct a 25,000seat swimming stadium plus a cycling arena and also the sailing and canoeing areas. Otherwise the facilities are already there for other sports. As a result we'll spend less money than many to the competing nations.

"The delegates know we can give them a better deal economically than any country. The surplus funds will be applied on a pro-rata basis to finance the travel and living expenses of athletic delegations from visiting nations."

Intelligent and articulate, able to speak the language of the athlete as well as the administrator, AAU track and field chairman Wright is a convincing spokesman for the U.S. After coaching at TSU

for 16 years and developing Olympic sprint champion Jim Hines, he resigned three years ago to become track coach at Western Illinois University. A graduate of Springfield (Mass) College with an MA degree from Columbia, Stan served as assistant coach of the 1968 U.S. Olympic team. Last fall he was named track coach at Sacramento State.

A persuasive individual, he needed all his charm to wiggle out of a situation at troubled Cairo, where armed guards and machine guns ringed the airport and authorities became suspicious of his temporary visa.

"I was detained for several hours. Of all things, they thought I was a CIA agent.

Maybe that spy stuff is all right for Bill Cosby. But it isn't for me."

For Stanley V. Wright the magic date remains May 12 in Amsterdam, and the battle with Russia for IOC delegates' votes arouses his competitive instincts.

"Remember, Russia entered this thing late. The deadline for entry was December, and they didn't make application until late November. In a number of places on our trip we heard that they did it only to deal us a propaganda blow. Think of what an effect it will have if Russia wins the games from the U.S on the 200th anniversary of U.S. independence."

Wright is doing his best to see that it doesn't happen.

## Excerpts From Interview With President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the U.A.R.

Special to The New York Times

CAIRO, Fcb. 14-Following are excerpts from an interview with President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic conducted in English Friday evening by James Reston, a vice president of The New York Times, in the presence of Mohammed Hassancin Heykal, chief editor of Al Ahram, at the President's residence here:

Q. Are there any modest steps that might be taken short of a permanent cease-fire to break the present diplomatic deadlock between you and Israel? For example, you are on the verge of a religious holiday. Would it be feasible to make a start with a temporary cease-fire during religious holidays on both sides?

A. This would be two or three days? I'll tell you something: There was no ceasefire after the Security Council resolution. There was a cease-fire from our side, but no cease-fire from the other ]

I have proof of that: the cities of Sucz and Ismailia, We were not at that time in a situation to answer, but every day there was bombing and shooting. Many civilians were killed. What happened yesterday in Cairo [the Israelibombing of a scrap-metal processing factory, where 70 people were killed) was not the first time.

Q. Could you explain your, strong objections to direct negotiations with Israel. The United States doesn't recoging nize China but negotiates with its people in Warsaw. What's the difference in your situation?

A. Really I think there is a big difference. I don't think you occupy a part of China, or China a part of the United States, but Israel occupied 20 per cent of our territory, about 70 per cent of Jordanian territory, and about 10 per cent of Syrian territory. So if we sit at this table with Israel] not it will be table of of capitulation. This means we would accept unconditional surrender.

On the other hand, there is nothing in the Security Council resolution [of Nov. 22, 1967] about direct negotiation. There was something about the representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations holding talks in order to implement the resolution.

#### Views on Rhodes Formula

Q: So I gather that the Rhodes formula for talks with the Israelis is not ac-

ceptable to you?

Answer: You know, for two years Jarring [Gunnar V. Jarring of Sweden who was the United Nations representative between the warring parties] tried to learn something about the ideas and hopes for the implementation of resolu-

We stated all our views about that, Jordan stated all her views about that, Israel refused. They said, 'We want to sit with the Arabs and talk and we are not ready to say anything about our plans. On the contrary, they said in their statements from the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense that they want a greater, bigger Israel. They decided to join Jerusalem. They talked about joining other parts from Syria from Jordan, and Egypt. So we look to the Israelis with suspicion and more than that. We are sure they want expansion.

You know, they are a coun-y without borders. They said that they have no borders and we want to negotiate about our borders. What is the meaning of that? This means expansion. This means that they want to add territories of other countries to their land. They talk about the next generation making the real borders of Israel.

O. When you came to power you came as a young revolutionary with plans to modernize your country and you hope to continue that revolution. Is this war an obstruction or is it a benefit to that revolution?

A. Really, it is not a benefit. At the beginning, we concentrated all our resources

and there were no plans about bringing more arms to the army. I got assurances from the American Government and the British Government that we must have se-curity and there would be no aggression by Israel against us, I was able to convince the army about that. But suddenly in 1955, there were aggressions against Gaza. Many of our soldiers were killed. This was the beginning between the Israelis and us after the revolution.

Of course, after the aggression came the need of having arms. You know the story. Britain refused, America re-fused and then we got arms from the Soviet Union.

Q. Where do you think things went wrong? When you started your revolution there was much sympathy for your objectives, in the United States and the rest of the West, and somehow this loitered down into misunderstanding and worse. What's your view about what was responsible for that?

A. I am telling you some-thing: The intention of the Israelis from the beginning was to create misunderstanding between Egypt and the United States. You know, in the beginning of 1955 we were in a very good relation. Then came this question of

the attack by the Israelis and we asked about arms: We were promised arms from the United States Government, but there were pressures against the United States and we were unable to get arms either from the United Kingdom.

Then, of course, we were; feeling that we were in a mess because the Israelis were strong and we were needing arms. Then came the people in this country to start fires in American properties, cinemas and so on, until we arrested one of them and he confessed he came from Israel in order to create misunderstanding between the United States and Egypt.

Then we were subjected to more aggression from the Israelis and the army was on building up our country asking for arms, and I'll tell you that in a revolution by,

the army, the first thing p ple think of is arms. didn't get any arms until 1955. Then we got in touch with the Soviet Union, and you know the rest of it. We got arms from the Soviet Union, so this was the beginning of the misunderstanding with the United States.

Q. In your view was this misunderstanding purposeful on the part of the United States? After all, you had long associations with Jefferson Caffrey, Hank Byroade and other American Ambassadors, including Luke Battle. Did you get the impression that the United States really does have imperialist ambitions to control or dominate this part of the world through Israel?

A. You know, at the beginning they tried to dominate this part of the world directly. You know, I was asked by the United States Ambassador just not to try to say anything about the area but mind our own affairs. One cannot isolate Egypt, I told him, from what is going onaround here, and of course, this was the beginning of the Baghdad Pact. I said we would not agree about the Baghdad Pact.

So they tried to control us in the United States, in cooperation with Britain, and they tried also to control the area.

This was clear in Mr. Eden's statement before Parliament after the signature of the Baghdad Pact that we Britain and the United States] will have a loud voice in this area, so the idea of control and influence really was there.

#### Statement on Cil

Q. In the communique you issued the other day after the Arab summit meeting here, there was an indication at the end that continued presence of the American oil companies was an indirect way by which the United States could continue financing this war through Israel against you. What was the meaning of that?

A. Well, really, one would have to ask himself the question: Israel was able to win the war of '67. Israel was able to destroy all the Arab

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### in Mideast Charged U.S. Bumbling

By William Tuohy Los Angeles Times

American diplomatic bumbling he describes in his book, "The Game of Nations," rethan incompetence.

"We had nobody who could know anything about this part of the world right after the war," Copeland said here.

the hottest-selling book in the Middle East, sold out in most book stores. It is published in London and is due to be released in the United States in

It tells in fascinating and sometimes humorous detail what is described as the inside story of various State Department and Central Intelligence Agency operations in Syria, Lebanon and Egypt.

#### Feisal Has It Translated

So revealing is it, particubia's King Feisal, as well as ser. other Arab leaders, have had copies translated into Arabic.

Copeland, 53, from Birmingham, Ala., was an Office of other stuffy memoir," Cope-Strategic Services officer dur-land says. "I wantd to tell Strategic Services officer during World War II, then vice CIA, working for the firm of over afterwards." Booz, Allen and Hamilton. He firm in association with Ker the amount of U.S. aid to mit Roosevelt, another former OSS-CIA operator in the Middle East.

years, Copeland became per-ser. haps the closest American friend of Nasser, and the book which arrived via Beirut, with seriously. focuses on the U.S.-Nasser re- Nasser's aide, writes Copelationships.

#### Nasser as a Hero

"If there is a hero in the book," Foster Dulles.

"Nasser may be flawed but other side of Cairo." he has demonstrated his abil-

ing out special emissaries to spite the Americans, he de-BEIRUT, Jan. 18-Author without letting the ambassa cided to build an "unfunc-Miles Copeland says that the dor on the spot know what was going on. It did not make for constructive diplomacy."

played the role of the Egypspeak Arabic and we didn't tian leader in the State Department where diplomats tried to figure out what various rulers "The Game of Nations" is would do under various circumstances.

> Thus the book, says Copeland, "is an application of game theory to political analysis." As such, it shows how leaders of weak nations have been able to gain leverage far out of proportion to their strength because of the way major powers have courted them.

In the book, Copeland delineates the behind-scenes role played by U.S. diplomats, military attaches and intelligence agents in the 1949 Syrian larly about Egypt and Presi- coup, in the 1958 Lebanon crident Nasser, that Saudi Ara- sis and during the rise of Nas-

#### Money Incident

"I didn't want to write anwhat really goes on in the consul in Syria, and later a power struggle among nations. management consultant to the not what is usually glossed

Copeland relates how, durnow runs his own consultant ing the 1953 argument about, Egypt, he transfered \$3 million in unvouchered U.S. se-In visits to Cairo over the cret funds to be given to Nas-

In counting the money, land, "we found there was only \$2,909,090. Hassan Tou- open up secret files in the hami's only comment was: 'We hope that Nasser would be won't fuss about the missing shown to be an independent says Copeland, "I sup- \$10," whereupon he and his sepose it is Nasser. And if there curity guards climbed into a nationalist trying to use the is a villain I suppose it is John large. Mercedes and headed United States in what he con-

But Nasser received the ity to play in the big leagues with the major powers, and he has eaten American diplomats says Copeland, and decided it

alive. Dulles was always send was an "attempted bribe." So, tional structure"--"something very large, very conspicuous, very enduring and very expen-Because of his friendship sive-costing, oh, say, somesulted more from inexperience with Nasser, Copeland often thing in the neighborhood of \$3 million."

> The result was the "Tower of Cairo," says Copeland, "which we American friends of Egypt see across the Nile every morning as we breakfast on our balconies at the Nile Hilton."

Though the book paints Nasser as a Machiavellian operator, Copeland says Nasser read it before publication and approved.

"Egyptian who officials know the real score like the book," says Copeland. "Those who don't know the score are horrified by it."

#### Reasons for Book

There has been widespread speculation as to why Copeland, who presumably still has ties to the U.S. intelligence community, revealed so much inside material about the CIA and diplomatic operations.

Copeland says that the British journalist-spy Kim Philby was privy to most of the secret detail and that the Russians may be presumed to know about it.

There is another reason, it was learned.

A couple of other authors were working on books purporting to show that Nasser was a virtual captive of the CIA during his rise to power, and the agency felt it would be harmful to American interests to have this view taken

Hence, they were willing to

for Nasser's residence on the ceived to be the Egyptian national interest.



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